


The arrival of Spanish missionaries to the Marianas in 1668 was a first in Pacific Island history; it signaled the beginning of intense Western presence in the islands. The troubled years that followed, marked by intermittent outbreaks of violence, came to be known as the “Spanish-Chamorro Wars.” According to the standard textbooks, this thirty-year period was one of utter devastation—forced conversion, rapid cultural change, precipitous population decline, and loss of Chamorro identity.

Or was it? The Spanish missionaries, at least in the first few years of their work, did not have the protection of soldiers. Later, when troops finally arrived, the priests themselves recognized that the troops could be more of a hindrance than a help to their own work. Then, too, the Chamorro people might have been far more divided than early historians imagined. Some might have eagerly converted for any number of reasons, social and political as well as religious. Spanish records of this period reveal the sharp divisions between members of the Spanish party as well as the polarization in the local population.

The clash of cultures was real, as the author of this work presents it, but the Chamorro people probably had more of a hand in determining the outcome than earlier historians credited them with. The sins of the colonizers were also real, if grossly overstated. Even if the massive loss of life was due to disease rather than outright slaughter, the worst crimes against local people—and Spanish troops alike—were the result of administrative intrigues of later Spanish officials. Overall, this work seeks to offer a better grounded and more nuanced understanding of this critical period of initial Western contact in the Pacific.

Front Cover Illustration by Robert H. Hunter
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WHEN CULTURES CLASH: REVISITING THE 'SPANISH-CHAMORRO WARS'

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The Northern Marianas Humanities Council is a non-profit, grants-making corporation established in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) in 1991. Its mission is to foster awareness, understanding, and appreciation of the humanities through support of educational programs that relate the humanities to the indigenous cultures and to the intellectual needs and interests of the people of the CNMI.

Preface

Even the most careful Pacific historians almost never get it right the first time. My first foray into the history of the Marianas—a fascinating territory but always something of a battleground—took place thirty years ago. At the Micronesian Area Research Center on Guam I was introduced to the wonders of the Spanish collection, which Marge Driver and Dirk Ballendorf had graciously opened to me. As I flipped through the documents with my modest reading ability in Spanish, I found that the pages suggested a story of early colonization that was very different from the one that conventional histories, with their ponderous statements and easy generalizations, had presented regarding early Spanish encounters with the people of the Marianas. I found myself especially fascinated by what happened after the early hostilities ended and the people were settled into towns under the Spanish flag and within earshot of the church bells. My research in the MARC treasure trove resulted in two articles on the early Spanish period in the Marianas: “From Conversion to Conquest,” dealing with the initial missionary thrust during the late 17th century, and “From Conquest to Colonization,” the early years of Spanish rule at the end of the hostilities often referred to as the “Spanish-Chamorro War.”

The second article, “From Conquest to Colonization,” was soon afterward expanded into a monograph published by the Northern Marianas Historic Preservation Office. Although it certainly could be amplified and enriched by further scholarship, I have never found good reason to alter substantially what I wrote at that time.

Such is not the case with the first of those articles, the piece dealing with the early years of the Catholic mission in the Marianas. Although I would still subscribe to a good deal of what was written in the original article, I have to admit that I missed an embarrassing amount of what later became clear to me and the others with whom I worked. My hope is that this publication will serve as a companion piece to the earlier monograph “From Conquest to Colonization,”

even as it corrects some of the errors in my previous treatment of this period. To set the record straight, then, I have tried to lay out an understanding of the Marianas in the late 17th century and a description of the course of events that is more consistent with what we know today. Part of that, of course, is owing to the deeper studies of the Spanish archival material that others have done. Another part of it is due to the richer understanding of cultural institutions in other parts of Micronesia—for instance, religious practices, ancestor worship and death rituals—all bound to shed light on practices in the ancient Marianas.

Without the Spanish documents at MARC, this monograph would not have been possible. The translations offered in Rodrique Levesque’s extensive series “History of Micronesia” have made the early documents more accessible to me like so many others. Works like this are never done without enormous assistance from others. David Atienza and Carlos Madrid generously shared their information and their insights with me along the way. Omaira Brunal-Perry, the curator of the Spanish documents, offered me access to these documents, while the other librarians at MARC facilitated my work with other sources. Finally, my gratitude goes to the Northern Marianas Humanities Council for assisting in the layout, sharing photos, and enabling me to bring this to publication.

Francis X. Hezel, SJ


Introduction

The Mariana Islands, a chain of volcanic islands running north-south in the northwest Pacific, were distinguished by a number of firsts among the islands of the Pacific. They were the first island group known to be visited by Europeans, the first formally claimed by a European or Asian power, and the first to have been colonized and evangelized. We might imagine, then, that the Marianas might be regarded as the bellwether for what would follow in the rest of the Pacific Islands as other island groups began to experience sustained contact with the West.

Yet, the Marianas is something of an anomaly in the Pacific. The pattern of early contact with the West there is more similar to what happened in the Americas a century or so earlier than to what the rest of the Pacific went through a century or more later. Introduced to Europe soon after Magellan's pioneer voyage into the Pacific, the Mariana Islands were at one and the same time colonized and evangelized by the Spanish during the final years of the seventeenth century. The close collaboration between the Spanish Crown and its Catholic missionaries, rooted in the *patronato* system linking flag and faith, itself signaled the end of an era. As the gospel was brought to other Pacific islands, missionaries might retain some ties with the state, but these would be far more tenuous and less lasting than those of the Spanish in the Marianas.

The Spanish entry into the Marianas in the late 1600s marked the beginning of one era—that of intense Western contact in the Pacific—but the end of Spanish colonial expansion and the apparatus that supported it. Perhaps this is why the period has been so poorly understood by Pacific historians. By nearly everyone who has written about it, the Marianas has been presented as the classic instance of the “fatal impact” of the West upon a defenseless island society. The enormous depopulation of the islands, supposedly as a result of the Spanish-Chamorro wars, and the cultural suppression that accompanied Spanish rule were viewed as the product of the religious fanaticism of the Spanish missionaries and their supporters. The Chamorro inhabitants of the islands are represented as having lost most of their people as well as nearly the whole of their traditional culture as a

THIS IS AN 18TH CENTURY FRENCH COPY OF AN EARLY SPANISH MAP.
Map of the Marianas, or the Islands of St. Lazarus, as they were sometimes called, with an inset of Guam.



consequence. Throughout this early period of colonization and evangelization, the Chamorro people could presumably do little more than submit to the superior force of Spanish arms.

This pivotal period in Pacific history has been clouded by what is sometimes called the “Black Legend,” the attribution to Spanish colonizers of deadly deeds brought on by the worst of motives. “Natives were slaughtered in great numbers whenever there was the slightest pretext for it,” writes one popular historian of Guam.¹ The missionaries and the government authorities are seen as working together, however their own aims may have differed, to avenge Spanish losses and force the population to submit to Spanish rule.

But the Spanish documentation of the period, when carefully examined, reveals a very different picture of what happened and why. It suggests that the very use of the term “Spanish-Chamorro Wars” is to exaggerate the intermittent outbreaks of violence at this time, especially when the modest loss of life is tallied. The Spanish records reveal the sharp divisions that existed between members of the Spanish party, not to mention the polarization that developed in the Chamorro people. The early sources also suggest that these Chamorro people were not the passive victim of those depredations that they are sometimes imagined to be, nor did they forfeit their cultural legacy at the end of it all. They certainly show that the depopulation throughout the period was the result of disease rather than violence. The historical evidence, to be sure, does not absolve the Spanish of all guilt for the damage done to the island people. But it does show that the harshest of the damage was not wrought by the soldiers’ arquebuses so much as by administrative intrigues that allowed officials to fleece islanders and Spanish soldiers alike.

In this monograph, then, let us examine the initial thirty years of missionary work in the Marianas Islands, 1668-1698.² These troubled years, marked by the intermittent outbreaks of violence commonly known as the “Spanish-Chamorro Wars,” were foundational in the history of the archipelago. Our concern here will be less to document the missionary accomplishments of the period than to trace the cultural upheaval and conflict during these years. In doing so, we will be drawing on more than the wealth of surviving Spanish written reports; we will also be making inferences on Chamorro religious beliefs and cultural ways based on what we know about other cultures in the region. Overall, our aim is to offer a better grounded and more nuanced understanding of this critical period of initial Western contact in the Pacific.

Early Contacts

The islands that later came to be known as the Marianas were the first that Magellan encountered on his historic voyage across the Pacific in 1521. During a brief layover at Guam in March of that year, Magellan and his half-starved crew welcomed dozens of islanders on their three ships only to watch them snatch whatever items they fancied before diving into the water and making off with their loot in canoes. Magellan’s crew killed a half dozen of the islanders for their impertinence and burned houses and canoes the next day when they went ashore to gather food for the voyage.³ That was a scenario that would be played out time and again on later visits to this group and other islands of the Pacific. The name Magellan bestowed on the islands following his experience, *Islas de los Ladrones*, was the Spanish equivalent of the name with which the English privateer Francis Drake baptized Palau (“Island of Theeves”) for the same reason.⁴ The term could have been given to any number of other Pacific islands in the years that followed.

Magellan may have put the islands he discovered on the map, but it was left to Miguel de Legazpi to take formal possession of the islands for Spain in 1565. This he did by making a formal declaration of Spanish sovereignty in the presence of a curious and bewildered throng of Chamorros, afterwards nailing the *requerimiento* to a tree, planting a cross on the shore and having mass celebrated to solemnize the event.⁵ Legazpi then left Guam forever and made his way to the Philippines where he not only claimed possession of that island group but established a full colonial government there, thus putting teeth in the Spanish claim.

Henceforth, the Mariana Islands were to be the possession of Spain. Or so it seemed at the time, at least. But the theory and the policy that governed such

claims of sovereignty in the name of the Spanish throne would change in the century that followed. The Laws of the Indies, the legal code governing Spanish official conduct and rights overseas, had been modified to prevent a recurrence of the abuses that had taken place in the New World. Only when local people showed active resistance to the evangelization that was, at least theoretically, the principal goal of such a venture could Spanish forces assume rule of the land. This was a significant advance; it was founded on the assumption that local authority was legitimate unless it was proven to be incapable of maintaining order. Hence, the Spanish Crown could not plant its flag and claim authority over a territory simply because the people living there were regarded as “uncivilized.” Spain could no longer supplant the local government, appropriating land and resources as it did so, on the grounds that its own rule and religion were superior.⁶

Legazpi’s stopover on Guam foreshadowed what was to come—not just through the declaration of Spanish sovereignty over the Marianas, but as a model of the type of encounters that would follow. An islander grabbed a musket from one of the troops and ran off with it, provoking quick retaliation from the Spanish: the latter shot and killed some Chamorro men as they were collecting water. In turn, the island people killed a young ship’s boy who was accidentally left behind by a shore party. That prompted another response from the Spanish. They set fire to a few canoes and, as men rushed forward to save their property, the Spanish picked off a few with their muskets.⁷ If Legazpi and his men had stayed longer, we can easily imagine that this violent exchange would have gone on and on. Indeed, this is precisely what happened just a century later when the Spanish finally arrived to take up residence in the islands.

Legazpi, of course, did not remain on Guam. Spain, badly overextended in its empire abroad, had neither the desire nor the resources to install another colonial government in the Marianas. Colonization was an expensive means of asserting national self-importance, especially in lands that lacked spices and precious metals and so could offer almost no return on the royal investments. Hence, the Marianas remained uncolonized and neglected, serving no purpose other than as a watering and provisioning stop for the galleons that began to make their yearly trade runs from Mexico to Manila shortly after Legazpi’s visit.⁸

It might have been otherwise. Shortly after reaching the Philippines, Legazpi submitted the formal recommendation that four religious, at least two of them priests, be sent to the Marianas to begin missionary work there. But this was never



FROM RUSSELL, 1998.
The wreck of the Nuestra Señora de la Concepcion off Saipan in 1638.

acted upon. Some twenty years later, in 1587, the Bishop of Manila requested that Spanish clergy be sent to evangelize the Marianas. He repeated his request twelve years later, but to no effect. Apparently, the available missionaries were busy enough in the new field that had opened up to them in the Philippines.⁹

When, at length, missionaries arrived in the Marianas, it was quite by accident and for a short duration. On several occasions clerics bound for the Philippine mission on Spanish ships, during their stopover at Guam, had offered favorable assessments of the potential for successful evangelization there. Three priests who reportedly went ashore in 1582 while their ship stood off the island were impressed enough to write to their respective superiors urging that a mission be established there.¹⁰ Not long afterwards, a priest took up residence there for a time. Friar Antonio de los Angeles, in 1596, disembarked from his ship to remain for a year before his supplies gave out and he was forced to board another ship to Manila.¹¹ Just a few years later, Juan Pobre de Zamora and another priest, shipwrecked when

the *Santa Margarita* went aground off Rota in 1601, worked among the people for seven months, but in the end they were discouraged at how little they seemed to be able to accomplish.¹²

A few western ships visited the islands during these early years: the English privateer Thomas Cavendish in 1588, and the Dutch explorers Oliver van Noort in 1600, Joris van Speilbergen in 1616, and Jacques Le Hermite in 1625. These early visits were brief, involved trade exchanges, and were marked by the amusing but sometimes tragic cultural misunderstandings that would continue over the course of the next century or longer.¹³

Then there were the occasional beachcombers, beginning with Gaspar de Vigo, one of three men who jumped ship during the Magellan expedition. He remained in the islands for four years before being taken off by one of the same expedition's vessels.¹⁴ When the Manila galleon *Santa Margarita* was wrecked off Rota in 1601, 40 of its passengers survived and made it ashore. Some of the survivors were taken off the islands by galleons during the next year or two, but several chose to remain. Several more foreigners were deposited on Saipan when another galleon, *Nuestra Señora de la Concepcion*, went aground off Saipan in 1638. There were undoubtedly other shipwrecks, such as the ones that brought Choco, a Chinese-born resident of the Philippines, and Lorenzo, a native of Malabar—both of whom would play significant roles in the drama that unfolded at the time of the first permanent mission. All of these castaways, of course, would have increased the beachcomber population in the archipelago.¹⁵

Moreover, Spanish galleons had been visiting the islands for over a century before the arrival of the Jesuit mission party in 1668. Interaction between Spaniards and islanders might have been limited, but trade would have been a regular occurrence at these visits. The Chamorro people would have acquired more iron implements and other cherished goods, which undoubtedly stoked the desire for still more of the goods that these ships could supply. By the time the Spanish came to stay, neither the prized iron nor the white skin of the Westerners who could deliver it was a novelty to the local population.

The Arrival of San Vitores

Diego Luis de San Vitores, the Jesuit priest who inaugurated the lasting Spanish venture to the Marianas, first stopped off at the islands in 1662 en route to his assignment in the Philippines. The layover lasted just a few days, long enough for the ship to take on water and fresh supplies, and none of the priests set foot on land—this was still regarded as too dangerous. Even so, as San Vitores watched the naked islanders bring out their produce and barter for precious bits of iron, he was touched with pity for them. They were poor: without clothes, without material wealth, and without the gospel message that could save them. So eager was San Vitores to begin work among them, he admits, that he had to resist the impulse to jump ship and start there and then.¹⁶ His letters speak of his realization that these were the people to whom he had been sent to preach the gospel.¹⁷ Whatever the nature of his intense spiritual experience during those few days, it is clear that the drive to found a mission there continued to consume him during his five years of ministry in the Philippines.

For the next five years San Vitores, whose family connections provided direct access to the Spanish Court, would pursue a vigorous letter-writing campaign to establish a mission in the Marianas. He soon found a powerful advocate for his cause in the Queen Regent of Spain, Mariana of Austria. She readily gave her blessing and authorized the necessary funds for the enterprise. But approval was one thing; compliance from authorities on the other side of the world was quite another. The governor of the Philippines and his underlings dragged their feet as long as they could, until the insistent demands of the Queen Regent forced them to provide the money and equipage San Vitores needed.¹⁸ In return, Mariana received the compliment of having the islands named for her.

In June 1668, San Vitores finally reached Guam to begin the mission he had desired so long. He came by way of Mexico, crossing and re-crossing the Pacific in a voyage that took about a year but allowed him to seek financial support from benefactors in New Spain and gather additional personnel for the mission. San

Vitores came as the emissary of the Spanish Crown charged by royal decree to convert the islanders to the Catholic faith. The *cedula* that authorized him to do so also instructed him to report on “the useful produce of the land and whether or not there are any minerals there,” but that was a mere formality.¹⁹ After a century of almost yearly contact with the archipelago through the galleon visits, no one was under any illusion that Spain would be rewarded for its trouble. There were no precious ores, no spices to be found on these islands. The islands, everyone acknowledged, would be just one more financial burden for the provincial government of the Philippines to bear. The only benefit that Spain could hope to gain from the mission was the satisfaction of fulfilling its sacred obligation to evangelize newly discovered peoples. As San Vitores pointed out in a letter to the Queen Regent, for Spain to fund the mission to the Marianas would refute the claim of “heretics” that “no expenditures are made in lands where there is no gold or other material benefit.”²⁰ Clearly, the only conquest in the mind of the missionary band and the nation that sponsored them was the spiritual conquest of the islands.

ARCHIVO HISTORICO NACIONAL. Drawing by Marcelo Ansaldo, S.J., showing where Fr. San Vitores and his companions disembarked on the beach at Hatgatña in 1668.



San Vitores arrived as the superior of a band of six Jesuits, two of whom he commandeered on the spot to fill out the number he thought he needed to begin the mission. In an earlier request to be allowed to undertake the mission, San Vitores had pleaded that he would need no more than “fifteen or twenty... God-fearing Filipinos, plus a few men who have been there before and know the language.”²¹ The Jesuit, as it happened, had the benefit of the latter. Two Filipinos who had lived in the Marianas as castaways for nearly twenty years accompanied him on the long voyage and provided lessons in the fundamentals of the language.²² He also had his complement of “God-fearing Filipinos” along with a number of Mexican creoles whom he had recruited along the way. Their number had grown from the original fifteen to 31 in all. These mission helpers were a mixed lot; they included a married couple, a blacksmith, a weaver, farmers and others who could assist the mission by force of example. The youngest were two boy sopranos barely twelve, while the oldest was sixty years of age.²³

Although only a handful of them had any military experience, they would serve as the military escort for the Jesuits—the *Escuadrón Mariano*, as San Vitores called it.²⁴ In point of fact, these people had been chosen for their integrity and their exemplary lives rather than their handiness with a musket or fearlessness in battle. From the start San Vitores had argued that there was no need for a military garrison, which would be costly and could create more problems than it solved. “Experience has shown that soldiers do not content themselves with defense of the preachers but commit depredations,” he added in what might have been something of an understatement.²⁵ What was the point of bringing in troops, he argued, when the islanders were so gentle and friendly? They had no idols or temples, were free from the drunkenness and other vices that commonly afflicted native peoples, and could be easily won over to the faith.²⁶ San Vitores had assembled his team with an eye to training a docile people to become good Christians, not to protect his party from them. The violence that he would soon encounter would come as a rude shock to him. It was only then that the priest, in a reversal of his original position, would realize just how vital to the success of his mission a military force was.


Even before the mission party disembarked, a Filipino who had been in the islands since the shipwreck of the *Concepcion*, brought his two-year old daughter to the ship to be baptized. Fittingly enough, this girl, the first of those to be received into the church, was given the name Mariana.²⁷ When the mission party finally

disembarked, they found that a large crowd had gathered to welcome them on shore. The party included a number of chiefs from nearby villages—“enemy” villages, writes Coomans, suggesting the troubled relations on the island—each of them clamoring for one of the missionaries to stay in his village except for one chief from the interior of the island who wanted the missionaries out.²⁸ Kipuha, the chief of Hagatña, the area in which the mission party landed, arranged a welcoming feast the following day at which all the local chiefs were given a piece of iron hoop before reciprocating with food gifts to the Spanish. Within a short time, the priests had baptized 23 islanders, mostly young children.²⁹ All of this was a promising start for the new mission: the reception of the missionaries with great fanfare, the obvious eagerness of the chiefs to have priests work in their villages, and the baptism of children so soon after landing.

Life in the Marianas

The enthusiasm for the missionaries who had been dropped on their shores was unfeigned, we have every reason to believe. They were, as their successors would be on so many other islands of the Pacific, prestige items—like a white shirt or a steel axe. The Spaniards were valuable links to the shipping traffic and the coveted items that it could bring—a point that was punctuated by the gift of iron hoop that the Spaniards passed out at the welcoming feast. Missionaries could also provide an important service in interpreting the mysterious words and ways of Westerners to the island people, just as the earlier castaways had. The feast for the new arrivals had barely finished when, as Garcia writes, “the chiefs began to compete as to which one would bring the fathers to his village.”³⁰ He adds that one or two of the chiefs from Rota who happened to be on the island were just as insistent as the rest. To satisfy the demand, “the fathers had to promise to split up and visit all the villages of the island.”³¹ The nearly universal clamor among the chiefs for a missionary to reside in their village need not be seen as a miracle of grace. It was more simply an indication that Chamorros placed a high value on what the Spanish could offer them. This recognition might be overridden by other considerations during the troublesome years that were to come, but it would never be entirely eliminated.

Village chiefs are mentioned repeatedly in these accounts, but there is not the slightest hint of a political authority at an island-wide or even regional level. This was bound to create a climate of competition in the island group—for productive land, for iron, for missionaries, for anything that might elevate the prestige of a village. If we may believe Coomans, Guam’s population of 12,000 at the arrival of San Vitores was “distributed among 180 villages, the largest containing up to 80 or 100 houses, or families, and the smallest ones from 6 to 10.”³² The population of these “villages” probably ranged from 50 or 60 people in the hamlets to 1,000 or more in the larger coastal villages. We can suppose that most of the hamlets



SKETCH BY JACQUES ARAGO. Traditional Chamorro village scene.

would have contained just a few families, with perhaps five or ten villages being considerably larger and Hagatña one of the largest.

The society was clearly matrilineal and the residence patterns matrilineal (with men ordinarily coming to live in their wives' villages), as was common throughout the Central Carolines, including Chuuk and possibly Pohnpei.³³ The chief of a village was no doubt the head of the highest ranking matrilineage in the locality. Other matrilineages founded when men married into the village were subordinate to the ranking lineage and its chief. If the system in the Marianas operated as it did in other Pacific islands, these subordinate groups would have been obliged to offer first fruits periodically to the chief as a recognition of the authority he held in the village.


There is a status consciousness, even in this largely egalitarian society, that shines through in the early mission accounts. When the entire village population of Hagatña presented themselves for baptism, people were shocked that the sacrament was administered to some of the lesser ranked people before their betters.³⁴ The forms of respect mentioned with such awe in the early missionary letters would have been paid to the chief and his close kin.³⁵ Yet, respect does not

always betoken authority. Even the *Chamorri*, whom the Spanish understood to be the “*principales*,” or highest class in the village, had limited authority, as the early Spanish letters make clear. One missionary writes: “The *principales*, whom they call *Chamorri*, have no authority over the rest, except for respect or reverence.”³⁶

Some early Spanish sources seem to make a three-fold or two-fold “caste” distinction in the population, with the people of higher status settling along the coast and the lower class living well inland. It is possible that the lower “caste” might have been those defeated in battle long before when they lost their original landholdings but were given leave to settle on the left-over pieces of land—that is, inland parcels without access to the sea. Although much is made of this “caste system” in the historical literature, the truth is that we are still puzzled by the suggestion of defined social classes in a society that seems to have been so egalitarian.³⁷

Chamorro society, then, had no stratified political system; it was politically fragmented. Each of the numerous villages on Guam and the other islands had its own chief, but even his own authority was constrained. As Garcia writes, “Neither the islands taken altogether nor the individual villages have a head who governs the others.”³⁸ Alliances between villages might be formed during warfare and possibly for other reasons, but these were generally temporary alliances of convenience and were easily dissolved. Notwithstanding status differences, in the archipelago as a whole, on each island, and even within the village itself, the basic rule formulated

SKETCH BY ALFONSE PELLION. Chamorro net fishing.



by one of the early missionaries seems to have prevailed: “Each one does as he wishes if no stronger man prevents it.”³⁹

The missionaries in the Marianas, then, could not do what their counterparts did in other places: cultivate the patronage of a strong leader who would facilitate (sometimes even force) conversions to the new religion. Kipuha, for all the protection he provided, simply did not have that sort of authority. If he afforded the missionaries a sheltered base of operations at the start of their work, his endorsement also had a downside: his affection for the missionaries could easily have made them a target for his rivals elsewhere in the islands.

Village life in the Marianas probably did not differ very much from the rest of Micronesia. Cook houses were simple structures, little more than fireplaces, in which food was prepared and distributed to the extended family. Dwellings, at least in larger villages, might have included the latte stone houses that were thought to be the homes of the more prestigious, but most of the islanders seem to have lived in simple thatch houses built on the ground. Canoe houses, found in the larger villages along the shore, probably served as hangouts for village men, as they do even today in the atolls of the Central Carolines. Young males (*urritaos*, as the Spanish called them) had their own type of clubhouse where they could associate with other youth, hone their fighting skills, swap stories about their exploits (sexual and otherwise), and enjoy freedom from the stringent respect behavior that was imposed on them at home with their female relatives.⁴⁰ These clubhouses, of a kind also found in Yap and Palau, drew sharp attention from the missionaries because select women provided for the sexual needs of the young men.⁴¹ The young men’s houses were not simply brothels, but a welcome escape for young men in a society that even the Spanish recognized as heavily female-dominated and respect-laden. The houses offered young men sexual liberties in a congenial setting before they married and so acquired the obligations to wife and household that they would carry for the rest of their lives.⁴²

Work was organized along gender lines, as it was in all Pacific societies, but such matters were of no more than passing interest to the missionaries. A matter of far more concern was the unclothed state of the people: men went around altogether naked, while women wore no more than a short apron to cover their pubic area. The missionaries, of course, did what they could to get people to wear clothing, but their approach was generally to encourage gradual change rather than insist on it from the start.

Early Mission Activities

At the invitation, or perhaps insistence, of Kipuha, San Vitores established the mission headquarters in Hagatña, building small wooden huts to serve as the rectory and the church as well as a larger structure to house the mission helpers and militia. As a matter of principle, San Vitores would allow no palisade surrounding the mission settlement nor fortifications of any kind. As in his adamant opposition to bringing a military guard, San Vitores was intent on avoiding anything that might subvert the gospel message of peace that he was carrying to his people. Almost immediately, San Vitores and one of the catechists began a long tour of the island to determine in what villages the others in the mission party should be assigned. At his return, his sponsors in Hagatña informed him that they wanted him to remain in their own village instead of wandering about the rest of the island. He was, after all, *pale ma’gas*, the head of the mission, so it was only fitting that he remain in the village that had agreed to host the Spanish visitors.⁴³

Once assured of chiefly protection for his priests, San Vitores dispatched two of the priests to Tinian and another to Rota in the north. The others would remain on Guam with him. The plan of action was to baptize children and the sick immediately, but to instruct adults in the faith before they were baptized. To young and old alike they would teach the prayers and songs that had already been translated into the Chamorro language.

After an enforced confinement of two months in Hagatña to satisfy his patrons, San Vitores was soon on the road again visiting the other villages of Guam. He must have presented a strange, even humorous spectacle to the islanders as he went about in search of people to instruct in the faith. The gaunt priest, then 41 years old, walked barefoot wearing a cloak of plaited palm leaves over his threadbare black habit with a conical palm-leaf hat on his head. This strange dress was inspired



ENGRAVING BY GREGORIO FESMAN. Fr. Diego Luis de San Vitores

by his spirit of poverty along with a naive desire to model the simple dress that he hoped his catechumens might learn to wear. Around his neck he wore a large rosary and he carried a long staff with a crucifix attached to the top. The priest, who was terribly nearsighted and yet refused to wear his glasses because he considered

them a luxury among so poor a people, had to be led along by a rope tied around his waist to avoid bumping into trees and rocks. In a small satchel he carried his only baggage: his breviary, a bible, the holy oils, and a supply of holy cards, sugar lumps and biscuits that he would pass out to children who could recite their prayers and catechism lessons.⁴⁴

San Vitores' mission approach, patterned after techniques that he had used with considerable success in Mexico and the Philippines, was as unthreatening as his appearance. When entering a village, he might form a procession with his mission helpers or military guard, filing in two by two as he repeatedly chanted couplets as a refrain. "Nuestra alegría. Jesu y Maria" is an example that Garcia offers.⁴⁵ He would then go from house to house, "baptizing and confessing those in need, explaining everywhere the Christian doctrine and singing prayers that he had composed in verses in their own language."⁴⁶ San Vitores was especially fond of children and would gather them to his side, entertaining them with his chanting, hand clapping and simple dancing as he explained to them a single truth of the faith. Those who could repeat what he had taught them he rewarded with treats from his satchel, and he would often appoint the quickest of them captain of his "army," giving him a cross as the insignia of his command. The children would then join the priest as he marched off merrily to another part of the village where the performance would be repeated. Although his playfulness had a natural appeal for children, adults, too, could relate to the buffoonery he drew on as one of the tools of his ministry. Even at this early stage in his work in the Marianas, San Vitores recognized the fondness of his people for singing, dancing and laughter.

It may be easier for us today to imagine San Vitores as a man staring down a hostile crowd with crucifix upraised, as happened on Tinian early in his ministry. Our image of the man may be of a serious apostle engaged in a life and death struggle for the hearts and souls of island people. But San Vitores is also the man who often marched into villages chanting religious rhymes to entice the people. He was the priest who chanted and sang until he became hoarse, the one whom his first biographer could fittingly describe as "Christ's troubadour."⁴⁷

By January 1669, barely six months after their arrival, San Vitores and his companions had the satisfaction of celebrating the dedication of the new village church in Hagatña, an imposing structure built of stone and lime. At about the same time they witnessed the opening of Colegio de San Juan de Letran, the boys' elementary school which had the distinction of being the first formal educational

institution in the Pacific. Not long after this, a similar school would be opened for girls. This was merely the beginning of what would be a rapidly expanding educational ministry; within a few years schools for boys and girls were established at several of the mission residences on Guam.⁴⁸




Crest of the Mariana Islands designed by Fr. San Vitores shortly after his arrival.

Initial Violence

At first everything suggested that the Spanish and Chamorros were destined to get along with one another famously. Chamorros were, according to all early accounts, a gentle and hospitable people, extremely tolerant of foreigners, as the presence of several castaways among them indicated. They had killed and been killed by foreigners before, but these slayings were largely retaliatory—at least as perceived by the Chamorros.⁴⁹ The Spanish party was made up largely of tradesmen rather than soldiers, and it was headed by an ascetical priest who was a committed pacifist and whose personal approach to evangelization was to entertain rather than threaten. Even so, the first trouble broke out in August 1668, just two months after the arrival of the missionaries. Fr. Morales, one of the two priests sent to Tinian, was ambushed and speared in the leg as he was on the way to baptize a dying man. Five days later, two of the men who had accompanied Morales—a Spanish sergeant and his twelve-year-old Filipino servant—were killed near Saipan when the men transporting them in their canoes suddenly turned on them with their machetes.⁵⁰ Meanwhile, there was a show of hostility even on Guam when Fr. Luis de Medina was attacked and badly beaten in a village on the other side of the island.⁵¹

What had happened to change the climate so suddenly? The Jesuits attributed the sudden trouble to a Chinese castaway named Choco, a resident of the islands for twenty years and married to a Saipanese woman, who was said to be spreading the story that the priests were poisoning people with the water they poured on their heads at baptism.⁵² On the face of it, Choco's stories would have seemed plausible to people who knew little else about the missionaries other than their keen desire to baptize sick children, especially those in danger of death. Many of the children baptized by the missionaries did in fact die soon after their baptism. After all, the priests would have baptized the dangerously sick immediately out



FROM BOXER CODEX. Chamorro warrior, as sketched around 1590.

of fear for their salvation (according to the theological beliefs of the time); on the other hand, they would have deferred the baptism of the healthy until they could have instructed their families in the faith. Garcia writes that the Jesuits noticed a sudden change in the disposition of people in the outlying villages of Guam.⁵³ People who had initially welcomed the missionaries into their villages now tried to conceal the paths with brush, denied the priests the usual food gift of breadfruit, and even came out meet them with spears in hand.

Choco's stories seem to have had a longer life span in the northern islands than on Guam, possibly because Choco's wife was from Saipan. In July 1669, Lorenzo,

the castaway from Malabar turned catechist, was seized by a band of people angry at the death of a child he had baptized a few days earlier. The crowd stabbed him repeatedly with bone-tipped spears and left him in a latrine to die.⁵⁴ Yet, the same mission sources make the point that the "nobles" of Hagatña do not place the same credence in the stories being spread. Garcia tells of a woman who at first resisted having her sick child baptized, but relented when her husband insisted that the child be baptized. The man was saddened, we are told, when his child died, but cheered up by the missionaries' assurance that he would be with God in heaven.⁵⁵ There was no violent response to the child's death as there might have been in more distant villages where people were unfamiliar with the missionaries and consequently much less favorably disposed to them.

The stories of the poison waters seemed to gain credence more easily in some places than others, especially in those parts of Guam and on other islands where the tales could not be weighed against the behavior of the missionaries. Hagatña, even after the death of Kipuha, was bound to the missionary group for better or worse. Moreover, the village people's day-by-day contact with the Spanish there rendered such malicious designs implausible. In other places, where the missionaries' ties were much weaker and where traditional rivalry with Hagatña remained in force, the stories might have found a far more ready audience.

The unexpected outburst of violence that took the lives of three mission helpers and wounded two Jesuits was compelling San Vitores and his fellow missionaries to re-evaluate their earlier tactics. They had no doubt that Choco's calumnies were poisoning the minds of the Chamorros and inflaming a simple and docile people to the point of outright belligerency. All of this was threatening to wipe out the mission which had started with so much promise. San Vitores had begun his work fully trusting in the power of love and meekness to convey the message of peace that he brought to the islands. So convinced was he that "conversion should be made with the gentleness of the Holy Gospel and without the noise of arms and military operations" that he had forbidden his militia (if it can even be called that) to shoot except in self-defense.⁵⁶ Perhaps stronger measures were needed after all if the mission was to survive. Hence, in a letter to the Queen Regent Mariana written not much more than a year after his arrival, San Vitores requested an additional 200 laymen from the Philippines, equipped with weapons as well as tools, to strengthen his militia. In addition, he asked that the galleons stopping off at the island be ready "to carry out punishment and remedy whatever misfortunes might occur."⁵⁷

Here was the confirmed pacifist who at first strongly objected to anything that might suggest military power now asking for troops and firearms to protect the mission and imploring the authorities in Spain to permit the yearly ship to punish those who threatened the peace. But without this military protection, he realized, the entire missionary enterprise could be ended.

San Vitores, now convinced that strong measures were called for, soon went about Guam preaching what in effect was a crusade against the enemies of the mission in the northern islands. A month or two earlier he had tried unsuccessfully to put a halt to a war on Tinian that threatened his fragile church there. Frustrated at his failure to pacify the island, he turned to other methods. With a few of his first Guamanian converts and a dozen of his Filipino militia, he set out for Tinian to confront the warriors from the two villages who were preparing to do battle with one another. The presence of the small force and their muskets was sufficient to prevent fighting for a time. It provided both sides with a convenient excuse to suspend hostilities for a time in keeping with the ritual of island warfare. When one of the warring parties tried to make a surprise attack on the Spanish militia, however, three of their men were killed by a small artillery piece that was fired to scare them off. At this display of firepower, both sides retreated and peace was soon afterward made between the villages.⁵⁸

This marked a turning point in mission policy. For the first time the use of force was sanctioned by the mission superior, San Vitores, who recognized that a show of power might offer the only hope of the mission's survival. This had led to the first casualties of local people at the hands of the Spanish. Finally, San Vitores had recruited his own recent converts to support the mission in battle; they would play an ever greater role in protecting the missionaries in the years to come.

New Wave of Hostility

The next outburst of violence was not long in coming. In early 1670, Fr. Luis de Medina and his Filipino catechist, Hipolito de la Cruz, were accosted by a band of young men on Saipan and killed as they were preparing to baptize a sick child. Choco's stories still had credibility in the northern islands, but other factors may have played a role in the death of the Jesuit and his companion. In the first place, inasmuch as Medina and his catechist were residing on Tinian at the time he was slain, the killers did not have to answer for their deed to those on that island entrusted with protecting the missionaries.

Even on Saipan the villages were seemingly divided in their feelings toward the Spaniards. According to the account of his last few days on Saipan, Medina was well received in the village of Tatafu, but was stoned when he visited Raurau and seriously threatened when he reached the village of Tipo. He might have been killed on the spot, but the band of armed young men following him seemed reluctant to offend the people of Raurau, who seemed generally well disposed to the priest despite their earlier taunting. Medina and the catechist were offered hospitality in Raurau, but only after the village chief, reproved by the priest, removed the "idolatrous images" on his shirt. The two men were killed the next day near the village of Cao.⁵⁹ All of this simply exemplifies the very different treatment that the missionaries might expect as they moved from one village to another. To ascribe clear motives for the killings in such conditions is all but impossible.

Perhaps even more shocking than the murder of the priest was the killing of a young Mexican mission helper the following year, in July 1671. Most of the violence prior to this had occurred in the northern islands, but this killing took place on Guam. Indeed, it happened in Hagatña, the village that had adopted the missionaries and protected them from the outset, although Kipuha, the village chief who had first welcomed the Spanish, was dead for two years when the incident

took place. The Mexican boy had wandered outside the village to cut wood to be used in making crosses when he was assaulted. Even if the motive, as Garcia suggests, was “greed... for a knife he had and a machete,” the occurrence of such a crime in an area that had previously been regarded as safe was an ominous sign.⁶⁰

Escalation quickly followed when the Spaniards picked up those suspected of the murder, accidentally killing one noble from Hagatña as they did. The Spaniards arrested several other suspects with the intention of giving them a fair trial—an enlightened measure in the eyes of the Spaniards, but one that was understood otherwise by local people. Even though most of the men seized were released soon afterwards, the local people were disturbed by the arrest and trials. In Garcia’s words, “the barbarians were so greatly offended by justice, to which they were strangers, that they behaved as if they would rather be killed without trial than be arrested and examined.”⁶¹ The people of Hagatña had been rudely insulted by their guests, as even the Jesuit missionaries seemed to realize after the fact. This was just another in the series of cultural misunderstandings that was to plague the whole mission enterprise. Retaliation for the killing of the Hagatña noble and the detention of many others would follow as soon as the young men of the village could be mobilized to take action against the Spaniards.⁶²

Meanwhile, resentment against the missionaries had been festering because of the way in which they treated the ancestral skulls that were to be found everywhere on the island. The priests had made no secret of their desire to destroy these sacred skulls on the grounds that they were a sacrilegious article used in the traditional religion. Indeed, the very first threat of violence on Guam occurred just days after the Spaniards’ arrival when a Chamorro brandishing a spear threatened one of the Mexican mission helpers as he was attempting to carry out San Vitores’ orders to destroy these shrines.⁶³ The resentment at the treatment of the ancestral skulls was now a far more significant issue, at least to residents of Guam, than Choco’s stories of baptismal poisoning, which had pretty much run their course by this time.

The missionaries were quite correct in judging that respect paid to these ancestral skulls was religious in nature. If we may assume that the religious beliefs and practices of the early Chamorros were similar to those of other island groups in the region, creator-gods or sky-gods in the mythology would have played a very minor role in the ordinary religious practices of the people. Instead, islanders nearly everywhere turned to a protector or guardian spirit for help, often the spirit of a person long dead. This spirit might become the exclusive patron of a single

lineage or family, although in some cases the spirit might be adopted by the entire village or island. A standard feature of this belief system was a shrine of some kind, often rather small, dedicated to the spirit. It might hold food offerings or perfume or other gifts, but it might also contain some relic of the ancestor whose spirit was now regarded as a protector. The skulls probably served this purpose in the Marianas, although it is clear that the leg bones were used to fashion spears—with the understanding, no doubt, that the *mana* of the ancestor would maximize their effectiveness in battle. Now and then people would call on a religious specialist—“sorcerers,” as the Spanish referred to them—to consult with the guardian spirit when special help was sought. When in a trance state, these *makana*, as they were known in the Marianas, were instrumental in providing access to the ancestral spirits.⁶⁴

With the *makana* upset at their threatened loss of status, villagers everywhere infuriated at the treatment of their ancestral shrines, and the people of Hagatña nursing a grudge against insensitive Spanish treatment of village nobles following the murder of the Mexican boy, the island was ripe for open confrontation. When Hurao, an influential resident of Hagatña, began to rally villagers to resist the Spaniards, his audience needed very little persuasion to go on the attack.⁶⁵ His speeches, recorded by Morales and later embellished with Enlightenment rhetoric by LeGobien, ought to be read in this context. They should be understood as an expression of frustration and anger rather than as an impassioned plea for a return to the pristine liberty of pre-contact times.⁶⁶

Island weapons: slingstones and spearpoint carved from bone.



In anticipation of a general attack, the Spanish did something they hoped they would never need to do: they constructed a stockade out of logs and branches to protect the church and other mission buildings. They raised two towers, one on the beach side and the other facing inland, and defended the stockade with such weapons as they had—the two ancient cannons, a few muskets and bows and arrows. The preparations were barely finished when the Spaniards found themselves confronted by a large number of armed Chamorro men—two thousand, by Garcia’s estimate. Then the posturing that was so integral a part of island warfare began. The Spanish militia managed to seize Hurao, with little resistance offered from the Chamorro forces. With their leader a captive of the enemy, the Chamorros found reason to suspend hostilities and inquire about terms of peace. Although the head of the Spanish militia, Juan de Santa Cruz, was in favor of pressing the fight and dispersing the enemy forces, San Vitores persuaded him to sacrifice his “soldier’s honor” and beg for peace, offering gifts of food and turtle shell to the attackers in a gesture that the Chamorros could only understand as surrender.⁶⁷

When the Spanish would not release Hurao, the Chamorro forces resumed their attack on the stockade in a desultory fashion. For the most part, they were content to hurl stones, although now and then they charged the Spanish position before they were easily turned away by the militia. The Chamorro siege had all the marks of ritualized island warfare: the ceremonial invitation to battle, the taunting of the enemy, the display of dexterity in avoiding the lances (or musketballs) of the enemy, and the aversion to full-on battle in which numerous lives might be lost.⁶⁸ Finally, the siege was ended a month after it began when a severe typhoon struck the island, doing far more overall damage than the battle had. The Chamorro forces had lost a total of five men during the entire month—heavy casualties only when weighed against the loss of one or two lives in the typical island battle. Yet, the total recorded loss of Chamorro life since the arrival of the Spanish three years earlier was just eight, while the Spanish suffered six losses of their own during the same period.⁶⁹

Where were the Chamorro partisans of the missionaries, those from Hagatña who had steadfastly supported the Spanish, in all of this? They were caught between loyalty toward their own fellow villagers, who were outraged by what the Spanish had done, and their allegiance to the priests and their party. As a result, they did what any islander might do under the circumstances: lie low and maintain a stance of guarded neutrality.⁷⁰

During the five months of uneasy peace that followed the siege, San Vitores reorganized the mission. With the arrival of four additional priests in the summer of 1671, the first new personnel since the mission was founded, San Vitores decided to renew attempts to win over the northern islands and assigned new pastors to Tinian and Rota. He partitioned Guam into four parishes, with a church and a pastor to serve each. All of this, of course, would be in vain if the violence were to continue and the future of the mission threatened. So San Vitores, who still had not received a reply to his request for more troops, sent three Chamorro converts to Manila to make personal pleas for reinforcements to protect the mission.⁷¹ In doing so, they were to speak not just for the missionaries themselves but on behalf of the converts they had made, many of whom lived in the area of Hagatña. San Vitores, as we have seen, reluctantly accepted the need for military protection, but his attitude seems to have been that the mere presence of troops would serve to deter attacks on the missionaries as they were going about their work. Even after the further outbreaks of violence, San Vitores was ready to pardon the wrongdoers rather than exact justice. The Spanish had made no attempt to find and punish those responsible for any of the attacks on the mission party or for the killing of the missionaries, much less exact retribution on the village population.

Escalation of Violence

The Chamorro people on Guam were increasingly divided in their feelings toward the Spaniards and what they represented. There were pockets of strong opposition. The Jesuit superior who succeeded San Vitores would soon forbid his men to visit the northern part of the island because it was too dangerous. Even in the south, which was regarded as much safer, villages were split on whether they would welcome the missionaries. Meanwhile, Hagatña continued to show mixed feelings toward the Spaniards. Reaction to the missionaries polarized the local population on Guam, just as lesser issues had time after time in the past. Villages were more than ready to take sides against one another on the matter, as events would prove.

Hurao had already contributed to the division as he went from village to village rallying the opposition. The complaints against the missionaries were largely personal—damage done to family shrines, insults paid to respected persons who were not in the habit of shrugging off such things, perhaps the death of a relative or prominent fellow villager. But certainly not at this point was a matter of imposing Spanish law by force of arms or compulsory conversion. Many of Hurao's listeners may have been people simply tired of the constant intrusion of the priests in their lives. Hurao, now free again to rally people against the Spaniards, resumed his tour of the island.

The uncertain peace on Guam came to an abrupt and bloody end in late March 1672 when Diego Bazan, a young Mexican recruit for the mission, was killed in Chochogo, an inland village that had become a rallying place for those who opposed the Spanish.⁷² One of the prominent men from Hagatña, exasperated by Bazan's continual reproaches to leave the married woman with whom he was living, arranged for his execution. At his request, two relatives from Chochogo ambushed the 18-year-old boy, cut him to pieces with their machetes, and made their way to Hagatña where they were creeping up to the rectory to claim more lives when the

barking of a watchdog alerted the sentinel and frightened them off. On the very next day, a party of two Filipino catechists and a Spanish escort whom San Vitores had sent to carry a message to Hagatña were ambushed in nearly the same spot that Bazan had been killed. The Spanish soldier was killed immediately, but the two Filipinos, Damian Bernal and Nicolas de Figueroa, fought off the attackers and fled by separate routes, only to be killed by others a short time afterwards. Four lives had been taken in two days, and the island was rife with insistent and disturbing rumors of a plot to kill San Vitores himself.⁷³

Within a few days San Vitores, who had been delayed finishing construction of his new church in Nisichan, a village on the eastern side of the island, set out to join his Jesuit companions at Hagatña. There he hoped to decide what course of action to pursue in the light of the recent bloodshed. On the journey to Hagatña, he and his trusted Filipino catechist, Pedro Calungsod, stopped at the village of Tumon to look for a mission helper who had deserted San Vitores at the first sign of trouble a few days before. San Vitores never found his frightened assistant, but he did meet a Chamorro elder by the name of Matapang whom he had converted after curing him of an illness that nearly proved fatal. When San Vitores offered to baptize Matapang's young daughter, his lapsed convert contemptuously replied that he would do better to baptize the skull in his house and stop killing children. If he did not leave at once, Matapang told him, he would slay the priest with his own hands. With this, the infuriated Matapang stalked away to find men and weapons to help him carry out his threat. No sooner had he disappeared than San Vitores entered his house and baptized the child. The priest felt that the salvation of the infant was of more consequence than any threat upon his own life; and that even if, out of concern for the child's soul, he had disregarded the orders of the angry parent, Matapang could probably be placated in time. San Vitores and his young companion had almost reached the outskirts of the village when Matapang and a friend of his, both of them armed, overtook them. Pedro, refusing to abandon the priest, was the first to die. San Vitores fell to his knees with his crucifix in his hand and uttered a prayer of forgiveness for his assailants. The two men were on him in an instant; one of them split the priest's skull with a stroke of the cutlass while the other buried a spear in his heart.⁷⁴

The slaying of San Vitores was a terrible shock to the Spanish, and the events that followed only added to their consternation. For the first time, the Spanish mounted a punitive expedition—the type that San Vitores, by virtue of his authority

over the militia, had forbidden when he was alive. But the punitive expedition ended in disaster when the Spanish column was attacked on both flanks as they waded through the waters of Tumon Bay. By the end of the day the Spanish party had burned several houses and canoes along the way, but three of their own men died from the poison-tipped spears with which they were hit. The Chamorro forces suffered only one death, although another man later died of his wounds. Hurao, the chief instigator of the violence, was killed a month later when he was accosted by one of the Spanish militia and run through with a sword.⁷⁵

In all, the Chamorro resistance lost three men to violence during the year 1672, while the Spanish party lost eight. By this time only 21 of the original band of 31 mission helpers remained, thirteen of them armed with muskets.⁷⁶ It appears that by now the survivors of this band felt that San Vitores may have been too lenient toward troublemakers and too willing to turn the other cheek. The Jesuit's readiness to forgive, a trait that had shaped military policy up to this point, was at odds with the need to teach local people a lesson so as to prevent future trouble, as the troops saw it. Fr. Francisco Solano, the gentle Jesuit who replaced San Vitores as mission superior, continued the conciliatory policies of his predecessor.⁷⁷ When he warned the militia against indiscriminate shooting, however, his counsel did not spring entirely from his pacifist sentiments. He was concerned that the local people, who were initially terrified by gunfire, might realize how awkward and inaccurate these weapons were and so overwhelm the missionary party by sheer force of numbers.⁷⁸ In any case, when Solano died of tuberculosis just two months after becoming superior, the Spanish were free to make some strategic changes in their response to local hostility. Since two more Filipinos associated with the mission, one of them a survivor of the *Concepcion* in 1638, were slain on Rota just weeks before Solano's death, the question of Spanish response to such violence took on added urgency.⁷⁹



Spanish on the Offensive

The violence of 1672 was followed by a year of peace, but the lull would not last long. “The year 1673 was a happy year,” as Garcia put it, “but the following year, 1674, was a deadly one... because of the many killings that covered it with blood.”⁸⁰ In February 1674, Fr. Francisco Ezquerro was killed while walking from Umatac to Fuuna, a village near Orote, to baptize a woman in danger of death. Five of his six companions were also killed as they tried to flee. The last of these mission helpers was seriously wounded by the attackers but managed to escape to Fuuna where he was cared for by the people, transported to the friendly village of Asan nearby, and from there brought to Hagatña.

Then, a few months later, at the arrival of galleon in June 1674, something happened that would reshape the colony for the next several years. While standing off the island, the ship was carried out to sea by winds and currents, taking with it three Jesuits and all the provisions intended for the mission. Stranded on shore, however, was Damian de Esplana, a 37-year old creole born in Peru and a seasoned veteran with 23 years of military service in Chile. Esplana was originally headed for the Philippines, but circumstances dictated that he would be stationed in the Marianas instead. Whether he was chosen on the spot to take the position even before the ship was driven off or simply the victim of bad luck, Esplana was immediately put in charge of the garrison on Guam with its 21 militia.⁸¹

Esplana, a trained military officer with service in Chile, had been fighting for the Spanish since the age of fourteen.⁸² He was quite literally a soldier of fortune, a military man who had been lured to the Pacific by the hope of making his own fortune in the galleon trade. After his initial two year term in the Marianas, he

FROM GARCIA 2004. *Slaying of Fr. San Vitores.*

would go on to the Philippines where he would serve as provincial governor of Cebu and commander of the Spanish forces in Cavite. Both of these positions would provide him with abundant opportunities for involvement with the galleon trade.⁸³

Esplana's arrival signaled a dramatic shift in tactics for the Spanish party. Esplana believed that "for the good of the Christian community it was necessary to give an example of punishment that would warn the barbarians, whom mildness only made more bold."⁸⁴ Esplana, with the full support of the Jesuits, reasoned that unless disaffected Chamorros were made to realize that they could not murder missionaries with impunity there would be no end to the mischief they would cause and their respect for the Spanish could be expected to diminish with each passing month. With no San Vitores, idealistic peacemaker that he was, to put the brakes on bold use of the military, and with the Jesuits still reeling from the latest episodes of violence that had broken out in 1672 and in early 1674, the new commander was free to set his own policies on the use of the military. Clearly Esplana was bent on seizing the offensive.⁸⁵

To send a strong signal that he would not be intimidated, Esplana chose as his first target Chochogo, one of the more lawless villages on Guam and a notorious refuge for the anti-Spanish element of the island population. He offered to spare the village if people were willing to allow the missionaries free access without impeding them in any way. When his terms for peace were rebuffed, his militia made a night attack on one of the nearby villages with the instructions not to kill women or children "but only those men who resisted." Evidently many men did in fact resist, because we are told that the people of the village lost "several lives," including that of one woman who was killed by mistake in the dark. The Spanish rescued her wounded infant son and brought him to Hagatña to be raised at the mission.⁸⁶ Two weeks later Esplana and his men attacked the village of Chochogo itself, burning the houses and destroying many of the lances they found. Despite the ferocity of the resistance, losses in the battle were light: two villagers were killed and no lives were lost among the Spanish.⁸⁷

A few months later, in November 1674, Esplana led his troops to Tumon when he learned that the villagers there refused to participate in any Christian programs. He found the village deserted, but he pursued a canoe that was fleeing. When he caught up with it, he killed one of the passengers, a man who had murdered Damian Bernal a couple of years earlier, and took the other men as prisoners. The

body of the dead man he had quartered and hung between two poles as a grim warning to others.⁸⁸

Esplana extended his campaign to the northern part of Guam in January 1675. He burned the village of Sidia when the people refused to make peace, and then he proceeded to another village (Ati), which he also burned. On the way, Garcia tells us, he "threw down a steep slope several natives who tried to impede his passage."⁸⁹ As Esplana continued his journey, he was met by the Chamorro chief Ayhi with his troops, allies of the Spanish who had come to destroy the village of Sagua, whose people were responsible for killing one of the Jesuits. The two forces combined as they went on to Pa'a, the area in which San Vitores was killed, and retrieved his crucifix.⁹⁰ Esplana marched on to the south in his relentless effort to subdue the pockets of resistance around the island. He and his troops burned the villages of Nagan and Hınca, both of which had played a role in the death of another Jesuit priest. Then they sought out the village of Tachuch (near Merizo), where trouble broke out when the villagers prepared an ambush for the Spanish. Esplana killed one Chamorro during the encounter and shortly afterwards captured the village chief, whom he had shot "as a warning to others."⁹¹

In his first year in the islands, Esplana had marched on several villages on Guam, serving notice that the Spanish party was no longer content to simply parry attacks from local opposition. The terms of peace that he offered the villages insisted that the villages open their door to the missionaries, but these terms were not always accepted. In all his skirmishes with local villages, he had claimed the lives of at least six known Chamorros as well as "several others." Esplana also introduced a ghoulish element intended to strike dread in the enemy when he had the body of the perpetrator of an early murder quartered and hung on a pole for public display. This was something that islanders, who practiced this sort of thing themselves, would have well understood.

The Spanish military, under Esplana, had gone on the offensive. The Jesuits could not praise this energetic commander highly enough; he was seen as the savior of the mission. To him was attributed the fact that "the Christian settlements are today in so advanced a condition that they look like a paradise of delights."⁹² That judgment of the man, however, would be greatly tempered in time.

When Francisco de Irrisari arrived in June 1676 to replace Esplana as military commander, he was given the title of governor, the first official in the Marianas to bear this title. For the first time, full civil authority would reside outside the

missionaries. With the new governor came fourteen new soldiers; these, together with the twenty troops that arrived the year before, brought the total strength of the garrison to over 50 men.⁹³ The new governor, intent on continuing the policies of Esplana, wasted no time in beginning a campaign to bring to their knees those villages that refused to admit missionaries and to punish those individuals responsible for the murders of the priests and their mission helpers. First he marched on Talisay, a small village inland from Agat, and at daybreak made an attack that left five people dead and a number of others wounded. Three children who were abandoned by their parents when they fled into the mountains were brought back to Hagatña, where the oldest was enrolled in the boys school.⁹⁴ Then, within a few weeks, Irrisari and his troops were off to Orote to quell an uprising that broke out when a local Christian girl had married one of the Spanish militia against the wishes of her father. The governor hanged the father of the bride for inciting the riot and sent the newly married couple to Hagatña for their own safety.⁹⁵

Irrisari continued Esplana's policy of trying to keep the people in check by a strong show of force at the first hint of trouble. He achieved about the same results: a brief period of relative calm, but at the cost of smoldering resentment among those Chamorros who had been burned out of their homes and awaited the first opportunity to avenge themselves on the Spaniards.


Organized Chamorro Resistance

Despite the strong measures taken by the Spanish, periodic outbreaks of violence on Guam continued during these years. In December 1675, Br. Pedro Diaz and two of his lay mission helpers were slain in the northern village of Ritidian after scolding a group of young men bent on getting into the girls' dormitory. According to Garcia, the older men in the village were disgusted by the violent display but were unable to stop it. The young men looted and burned all the mission buildings before their fury was spent.⁹⁶ Barely a month later, in another northern village (Upi), Fr. Antonio de San Basilio was killed with a blow to the head by a man he had accused of cheating him in a trade bargain. When the people of the nearby village of Tarragui, who were devoted to the priest for favors he had done them, heard about his death, they sent a force to Upi to challenge the people to a battle. When no one came out to oppose them, they burned the house of the man responsible for the killing and recovered the body of the priest, which they buried in their own village.⁹⁷ Both these killings, which took place in the northern part of Guam, were angry responses to personal insults or threats, as they are recounted in the Spanish documents. The documents also make clear the divided response of the local people in the area over the killings. In the first incident, at least some of the people in the village were clearly disturbed by the violent action, while in the second, some of the local people went so far as to retaliate on the persons responsible for the killing. Such reactions reflected the growing divisions among the people of Guam regarding the Spanish and their program.

By this time many people on Guam had good reason to resent the missionaries. The new Spanish offensive had seen to that, with the houses burned and the punishment exacted on those implicated in killing the priests and lay missionaries. The old stories about the poisonous waters of baptism may have lost their credibility,

and even the strident mission campaign against the veneration of the ancestral skulls might no longer have shocked the sensibilities of most Chamorros, but new fuel for hatred was being supplied every month. All that was needed was for an incendiary to strike the match. Aguarin, who like Hurao came from Hagatña, was happy to do so. As Hurao did five years earlier, Aguarin began visiting villages on the island in the late summer of 1676 to rally the disaffected. That Aguarin was blind did not seem to prevent him from making a circuit of the island; besides the centers of resistance to the Spanish in the north and the west, he stopped off at those southern villages that had been punished in recent years—Tarisay, Orote, Fu’una, Sumay and Agofan.⁹⁸ Like Hurao before him, Aguarin rallied the people of these disparate villages to bond together under his lead in order to drive the Spanish from the island once and for all. The litany of complaints, as Garcia reports it, was long. Not only have the Spanish “killed our children with the water of God,” but they have “taken possession of the hearts of the children who survived, teaching them to taunt as traitors those who have resisted the Spanish.” In their adamant opposition to the bachelors’ houses, they “deprive parents of the good price they would have received for the services of their daughters in these houses. Instead, they seek to marry off the girls to their own mission helpers or soldiers.” They insist that we attend church services and religious instruction, he continues, when we would rather be “fishing, weaving nets, or building boats.” Under such conditions, Aguarin asked, “What death is worse than the life we are forced to live?”⁹⁹

Then, in late August, the Chamorro resistance struck. In the middle of the night they set fire to the church and mission quarters in Ayra’an. In response the Spanish commander arrived with forces and left eight men to protect the missionaries stationed in nearby Orote before he returned to Hagatña. A week later, as they were leaving for Hagatña, the pastor of Orote, Fr. Sebastian Monroy, and the troops who accompanied him were attacked by a large force of armed men. One of the soldiers was sent on ahead to warn the Spanish commander of the ambush, while the rest of the Spanish prepared themselves for almost certain death. Suddenly, a man by the name of Cheref appeared who came to the defense of the beleaguered Spanish and invited them to jump into his canoe to make their escape. When the Spanish had put some distance between themselves and the mob in Orote, the seemingly friendly Cheref suddenly capsized the canoe and had his men finish off the priest and his companions with spears and clubs.¹⁰⁰ The incident dramatized the problem of discerning who in a divided population were genuine



supporters of the missionaries and who were only dissimulating while they waited for an opportunity to exact vengeance for an injury that they or their relatives had suffered at the hands of the Spanish.

The Spanish, now alerted to the threat of a general uprising on Guam, fortified their presidio in Hagatña just as they had in similar circumstances five years earlier. They reinforced the walls of the stockade, put up several new sentry stations, and changed the layout of the buildings to ensure greater security. Antonio Ayhi, perhaps the most loyal supporter of the missionaries, arrived with his men to assist the Spanish, but he was advised to leave the area for fear that his affiliation with them would bring repercussions to his own people.¹⁰¹ Divided loyalty was once again the unresolvable issue. After their local allies had left, the Spanish awaited the attack that they knew was soon to come.

In mid-October 1676, Aguarin appeared with a force of 1,500 men in front of the stockade, defended by some 40 Spanish militia equipped with 18 muskets. The siege began with the usual ritual: the Chamorro warriors took up a position just beyond the range of the muskets, yelled their taunts and launched a volley of slingstones. True to form, the Spanish sallied out to engage their enemy, but the attackers fled in the face of the musket shots. (After all this time, the muskets still inspired dread in the local people, it appears.) Early in the siege, the Chamorro forces destroyed a nearby cornfield that was the principal food supply of the Spanish, but the defenders survived on the crops they were able to produce in the

limited land area within the stockade and what could be smuggled in to them by their Chamorro allies. As the weeks passed, the Spanish militia made sallies against their enemies, sometimes killing one or two men before the force fled into the hills. Desultory attacks on the stockade continued until late January 1677, with the militia easily repelling the attacking forces. Even a coordinated attack by land and sea was repulsed. Finally, nearly four months after the siege began, the Chamorro forces simply vanished.¹⁰²

Positions had hardened and Chamorro resistance on Guam had again been organized as it had been five years earlier. The outbursts of violence were more intense during the three previous years than they had been at any time since the arrival of the Spanish. During these years, 1674-1676, at least eighteen Chamorros were killed in the fighting, according to Spanish reports, but the total was almost certainly higher, with perhaps as many as 25 or 30 lives lost.¹⁰³ During that same period, the Spanish party had lost eighteen men.¹⁰⁴ The balance of lives lost had tipped in favor of the Spaniards. As for Aguarin, the mastermind of the uprising, he managed to elude the Spanish for a few years but was recognized and killed by Spanish forces in 1679 while coming ashore in a canoe.¹⁰⁵

Spanish Suppression of Resistance

Antonio de Ayhi was far from the only local partisan of the Spanish, but he was certainly one of the most celebrated. As anti-Spanish sentiment was growing during the months before the siege in Hagatña, Ayhi did what he could to keep the village loyal to the missionaries even as he prevented hostile Chamorros from passing through the village on their way to battle. Together with other allies, he attempted to bring food supplies to the Spanish when they were under attack. Despite a lapse during which Ayhi left his wife for a time to live with another woman, he remained as strong a supporter of the missionaries as ever. Not even the derisive remarks that he was nothing but a lackey of the priests, when he put aside his mistress and was reconciled with his wife, could weaken his resolve.¹⁰⁶ Ayhi was not alone in his support of the mission. Ignacio Hineti, of nearby Sinajana, and Alonso So'on, from Agat, led battalions to assist the Spanish in their retaliatory strikes against villages.

There were villages on Guam, as there were on Tinian and Saipan, known to be friendly to the missionaries, as we have seen. The students in the mission schools—by this time there were at least four villages on Guam with such schools—would have been committed to the Spanish and undoubtedly exerted influence on their families to take their side in altercations. In some cases, the students resisted strong family pressure and the tug of close kin ties to retain their loyalty to the missionaries. We read of one young mission student whose father was killed in a skirmish with the Spanish and whose older brother had been sentenced to execution, but who still remained a committed Christian.¹⁰⁷ Meanwhile, the militia was establishing ties of its own with local families as more of its number married local women. In 1677 six of the militia were married to island women, many of them girls who attended the schools; by 1680 their number had grown to ten.¹⁰⁸ The links of the Spanish to the island people—even apart from those they had baptized—had greatly multiplied

over the years, and so had the number of Chamorros who for one reason or another regarded themselves as obligated to the Spanish.

These ties were once again tested when the new governor, Juan Antonio de Salas, who had arrived in June 1678 with 30 new troops, resumed the campaign against those villages that resisted Spanish rule. In doing so, Salas was attempting to complete the work begun by Esplana and continued by Irrisari. With his troops Salas made an assault on the village of Apoto in the northeast and burned it to the ground, killing one person there. The Spanish then marched on Tupalao where they did the same, killing one man and bringing two children back to Hagatña for enrollment in the school. When they turned south toward Fuuna, they met resistance, whereupon they killed a number of men before putting the torch to the houses. They did the same in Orote and Sumay, other seats of resistance, and then in Talofoto and Picpuc in the east.¹⁰⁹

These expeditions, writes Garcia, “struck terror into all the islanders... and the friendly natives no longer hesitated to declare themselves bitter enemies of the wrongdoers and rebels.”¹¹⁰ Once the Spanish started storming villages one by one and demanding allegiance, the people loyal to the missionaries from the beginning had some breathing space. They did not need to prove their good faith to the Chamorro elite in the villages; the burden had shifted to the latter, who now were compelled to demonstrate their bona fides to the Spanish. During their sorties to the villages, the Spanish explained the new rules they intended to enforce. It was expected that a person who was known to have participated in a killing or incited rebellion would be apprehended and turned over to the Spanish. Anyone who concealed a killer or rebel in his house would be hanged, and a village that provided refuge for such a person would be punished severely. The promulgation of these new rules was surprisingly well received by the local population, one of the Jesuits reports. He explains that the motives for ready acceptance of these rules were mixed: some hoped “to ingratiate themselves with the Spanish, others to achieve pardon for their crimes, and all of them hoping for a reward.”¹¹¹

The “rewards” for collaboration with the Spanish included special recognition and a formal title—always an attractive prize in this island society—along with the badge of authority. Hurao and Aguarin might play on cultural pride to rally their people to band together against the Spanish, but there was no institutional model in their own society for keeping such a diverse group bound together. Village alliances were fragile and temporary; they were the exception rather than the rule in a society

as fragmented as theirs. The Spanish, on the other hand, selected local individuals for key positions in the village and offered them symbols of their authority. Often enough the Spanish would designate someone as the captain of the village police force, bestowing on him as they did a wooden staff that he was to carry as the sign of his office. The captain in turn was encouraged to deputize some of his own men as corporals. In effect, the villages began adopting the military ranking system of the Spanish.¹¹² Naturally, the village force was expected to march with the Spanish against other villages that held out against the acceptance of Spanish law.

The effect of all this was to put the “troublemakers” on the run, turning “criminals” into fugitives—“exiles within their own country,” as one Jesuit put it.¹¹³ No longer could these individuals depend on the protection of their own people, for the villages now had abundant incentives to turn them in to the Spanish. It was not long before villages began freely handing over “criminals” to the Spanish, sometimes killing these men themselves before turning over their heads. In January 1679, Ignacio Hinete, one of the most devoted champions of the missionaries’ cause, killed three people from Tarragui who had been involved in some of the earlier unrest. Hinete informed the governor so that he might send someone to bring back the heads of the three men and impale them on the wall of the fort as a warning to others.

Other supporters of the Spanish began offering to bring back the heads of those who were responsible for the murders of the priests and troops. The people of one village in the south presented the Spanish with the head of the man who murdered Fr. Ezquerro. Shortly afterwards, Governor Salas himself shot and killed the murderer of Fr. Monroy, bringing back his head and hands to Hagatña as trophies.¹¹⁴ Later that year a prominent woman from the village of Sydia in the south delivered to the governor some more of the men responsible for the slaying of the Jesuit priest and his military escort. She also presented him with the heads of others who had shared responsibility for the deed. In nearby Fuuna, villagers helped the Spanish militia identify two of the persons who had killed another priest a few years earlier; one of the two was brought back to Hagatña and executed.¹¹⁵ The people of Tarragui handed over the two killers of Fr. San Basilio, one dead and the other soon to be executed. Even the body of Matapang, the man who killed San Vitores, turned up in April 1680, after the people of Rota sent it to Guam in the hope of avoiding punishment from the Spanish.¹¹⁶

San Vitores would have been horrified if he had lived to see what was happening—the blood price exacted for the killings of the missionaries and their helpers, the heads and sometimes hands of the killers hoisted aloft as a warning of what would befall others who resorted to violence. Yet, the escalation had sprung from the Spanish conviction that, unless stronger measures were adopted, the violence would continue to mount. At first, the Spanish retaliated only when one of their number was killed, lest the local people think that they could kill with impunity. Then, the retaliation occurred whenever there was an outbreak of violence in a village, regardless whether or not lives were lost. After the show of organized opposition at the siege of Hagatña, however, the Spanish began marching on villages that were thought to be resisting Spanish claims to authority, especially those harboring criminals. The Spanish resolve to capture leaders of the active resistance now meant that they would march into a village, frequently accompanied by their Chamorro allies, and destroy houses and canoes unless they got what they wanted. To resist was to risk the loss of lives as well. Villages that had once been hostile toward the missionaries came to ask for peace, especially after the individuals who were hiding out there had been killed.

The loss of life had been more dramatic than heavy—with each death a staged event. There were the public hangings in the village plaza, the heads stuck on posts, the taunts of the people as the convicted man was hauled away to his death. Still, the number of people claimed by the violence of these years was fewer than the narrative might suggest. Between 1677 and 1680, the missionary letters name fourteen people killed by the Spanish and their allies, although the records acknowledge the deaths of “a few others” on two or three occasions. The death toll during this four-year period was probably comparable to the three-year period (1674-1676) that preceded it: 25-30 Chamorros.¹¹⁷ As this retaliatory policy was carried out and those dissatisfied with the Spanish program went into deep hiding, Chamorro resistance seemed to have broken down. Those sympathetic to the Spanish were clearly in the ascendancy during this period, but the old divisions would reassert themselves in the years to come.

The New Face of Guam

By June 1680 one of the Jesuits could report that the island had been “quiet for more than a year.”¹¹⁸ While it was true that there had been no hostilities for over a year, the shadow of past violence still hung over the island, preventing the missionaries from making visits to the more distant villages alone. They still could not safely leave the garrison without an escort. “The mission is so dependant upon arms that without them nothing can be done, because the local people pay little attention to the Fathers when they are alone,” one newly arrived Spaniard observed. “The people here respond only to fear,” he concluded.¹¹⁹

Despite the violent death of six of their men, the number of Jesuits was increasing steadily with the arrival of new recruits, attracted in part by the hope of martyrdom. Six came in 1674 and five more in 1676, with others arriving every two or three years thereafter. By 1680, the Jesuits numbered thirteen—ten priests and three brothers—a large corps of men frustrated at their confinement and driven to find ways of reaching the people in the villages.¹²⁰ Two years later, the number of priests in the mission had grown from ten to fourteen, even as the population was rapidly dropping.¹²¹

Spanish troops would have to accompany the priests on their visits to the villages of Guam, some of which had not been visited since 1676. The sorties to island villages began late in 1679 when two priests accompanied by 40 troops and another 40 Chamorro allies left Hagatña. Many of the villages were abandoned by the inhabitants, who had gone into hiding. In most cases, the people returned once they were assured that they would not be harmed, so the priests could conduct their instruction and pastoral services. The Spanish militia marched to Tarragui, where they were received with nervous embarrassment since Aguarin had made his home there during the uprising. At Ritidian in the north the Spanish received a spirited welcome as the whole village population came out to greet the troops singing the couplets of San Vitores’ *doctrina* and reciting prayers alternately in Chamorro and



SKETCH BY LOUIS AUGUSTE DE SAINSON. Women tending the gardens outside the government center.

in Spanish.¹²² A few towns, like Hanum on the eastern side of the island, would not submit, so some of the houses were burned.¹²³ Much the same happened at Chapaz and Chochogo, hostile villages in the interior. But the Spanish found the last of their sorties—their nine-day visit to the southern part of the island—very fruitful. There was no need to burn houses or canoes there; the two Jesuits had ample time to carry on their pastoral work among the people.

Everywhere they went, the Spanish party eliminated anything that was seen to be in direct conflict with Christian belief. They burned the young men's clubhouses—30 were demolished in a single year—and destroyed the ancestral skulls they found in the homes.¹²⁴ In some villages they also broke up the lances that had been prepared for warfare. Meanwhile, the priests baptized dozens of children, taught Christian doctrine to young and old, and celebrated mass for the population. Before they left the village, the priests would often select a handful of boys and girls to attend the mission school in Hagatña where the children would be taught to read and write while they learned their catechism.¹²⁵

Many of the old centers of resistance on Guam had undergone a change of heart, not just out of fear of Spanish retaliation—although this was an undeniable

concern—but because so much of the island had come to accept the missionaries and what they stood for. Key village chiefs were now tightly allied with the Spanish, and the foreigners seemingly had friends everywhere. Even the children—and not just the boarding students in the mission schools—had become followers of the missionaries. After a man from Orote had been hanged for leading an insurrection, small children dragged the body along the shore, pelting it with stones as they shouted their taunts: “Die, dog, die. You refused to be a Christian.”¹²⁶ The Spanish troops still met with resistance in the villages of Hanum and Chochogo, situated well in the interior of the island, but such places had become rare by this time.¹²⁷

The Jesuits were pleased with the changes occurring at this time. Fr. Luis de Morales, the superior of the mission, could report that most of the people attended mass regularly and that Christian marriage before a priest and witnesses had all but completely replaced the traditional ceremonies.¹²⁸ Indeed, 150 couples had been married in church just in the past year or two, one of the priests reported.¹²⁹ But the two most telling changes observed by the missionaries showed that the cultural resistance they once faced had been largely overcome. People regularly brought their infants for baptism without fear, they reported. Many even brought their deceased to the church for burial in consecrated ground—something unthinkable in the old days when people could not bear to be separated from their beloved dead ones.¹³⁰ Moreover, those who attended mass were now wearing clothes, even if they had to borrow them. Families were even learning to grow and spin cotton and make clothes so that they could appear modestly dressed in public.¹³¹

Hagatña, a town under siege just four years earlier, now had an enlarged church with a capacity of 1,000 that was situated outside the stockade. People came from five miles away to attend Sunday mass.¹³² Afterwards one of the priests would hold religious instruction classes for the 200 young boys and girls living in the area, another of the missionaries would instruct the wives of the soldiers, and a third would take charge of the young adults.¹³³ Each afternoon a drum roll summoned the soldiers to the church to recite the rosary. In the evenings the women could usually be heard singing their prayers in church, with groups replacing one another, between 7 PM until 10 PM.¹³⁴

As the largest and most prominent of the villages on Guam, Hagatña was well on the way to becoming the prototype for the other towns that the Spanish were establishing in other parts of the island. The widely dispersed settlements on the island, numbered at about 180 when the Spanish first arrived, presented a challenge

to the missionaries, who were expected to visit their parishioners frequently. The challenge was all the greater since the priests could not safely visit them without a military escort. A few years earlier, one of the Jesuits voiced his reservations about relocating the island people in a few population centers. “The religious should go to the towns,” he argued, “the towns should not go to the house of the religious.”¹³⁵ Yet, the realities of the situation on Guam suggested that the missionaries adopt the tried and tested pattern that had served so well throughout the colonial world—reduction of the population to a limited number of towns.

Even in Hagatña the concentration of the population was not easily accomplished. According to one Jesuit, the residents of seven rural homesteads within a mile or two of Hagatña were strongly opposed to resettling in the town at first. In the end, they were persuaded by the argument that in relocating they could have their cake and eat it. They would retain rights to their ancestral land and could continue to work it even as they enjoyed the advantages of town life. Their acquiescence gave the project the momentum it needed. Once they settled into their new residence, twelve other families did the same. “All these people now live together in one town located less than a mile from our garrison,” boasted one of the priests.¹³⁶ Soon there were three barrios housing a total of 300 families within a mile or two of Hagatña: Sinajana, Anigua, and Santa Cruz (part of East Hagatña today). The concentration of the population in the largest village of Guam was well along the way to completion.¹³⁷

The transformation that had occurred in Hagatña was happening in other parts of the island as well. By 1680 the reduction of Guam had advanced to the point that there were now seven towns, each with about 1,000 people. They included Hagatña, Pago, Agat, Inarajan, Umatac, Inapsan (located on the northern tip of island) and Mapupun (located inland from Apra).¹³⁸ The populations of the tiny hamlets surrounding each of these towns were consolidated into the town with the understanding that people could retain their land in the interior and use it for farming. Still, the Spanish burnt the houses in the outlying areas to discourage the people from resettling in their old homes.¹³⁹ Thus was introduced the split settlement system that would be a standard feature of life in the Marianas for the next two centuries or longer: people resided in the town but spent lengthy periods of time on their own ranch to grow crops. People divided their time between their home and their *lanchu*, or farmstead.

BAUZA: MUSEO DE AMERICA.
Guamanian couple in simple clothes as
sketched in 1792.



The entire island was taking on a new look. In all the new towns, at the direction of the Spanish, those people recently resettled from the outlying hamlets were building their new homes in orderly rows. Each of the towns had a church and a rectory for the resident pastor. Within a year, the new governor would authorize them to choose mayors from the local population, with the mayors granted the authority to pick the assistants they needed for the administration of the towns.¹⁴⁰ The organization of the leadership of these new towns would be modeled on the Spanish military: the *maestre-de-campo* held the highest authority, with a *sargento mayor* beneath him, and others with the title of *capitan* assisting.¹⁴¹

Hagatna especially wore a new face. The town included 200 houses occupied by the troops, who numbered 115 by this time, and some of the trusted Chamorros.¹⁴² The Spanish troops and others living within the walls had their own stone church, separate from the much larger one outside the stockade where the local population attended services. The Jesuit residence, large enough to accommodate the seventeen priests and brothers in the mission, was also located within the stockade. The boys' school and the girls' school, with a combined enrollment of nearly a hundred, were also located in the enclosure. There was a newly constructed hospital for the troops,

the solidly built governor's home that doubled as a fort, and the royal warehouses in which were kept the supplies brought in by ship along with the corn, rice and fish provided locally. The armory in the settlement contained, besides the usual swords, pikes and muskets, four artillery pieces salvaged from the galleons that had been wrecked off the islands. The whole core of the town was enclosed by a stockade, formerly made of wood but then being rebuilt of stone. Two gates, one facing the sea and the other the mountains, opened into the stockade.¹⁴³

With the arrival in June 1681 of the new governor, Antonio de Saravia, the build up of the island accelerated. Saravia, a veteran of Flanders with thirty years of distinguished service for the Crown, was appointed by the King of Spain as the first official governor of the Marianas.¹⁴⁴ With Saravia's appointment, the Governor of the Marianas was no longer subordinate, at least in theory, to the royal authorities in the Philippines or Mexico. Saravia, noted for his gentleness and highly regarded by everyone, was sent with royal orders to control the unrest in the Marianas. This he did not so much by dispatching military patrols to subdue remote parts of the island as by his masterful use of the art of diplomacy. One of his first official acts was to appoint Antonio Ayhi, one of the most steadfast allies of the Spanish, as lieutenant governor of the colony and to formally invest him with the title of *maestre-de-campo*—the rough equivalent of colonel.¹⁴⁵ Ayhi, in turn, was instrumental in convincing the other major village chiefs to take the oath of allegiance that Saravia administered on September 8, 1681.¹⁴⁶ These chiefs were deputized to represent the governor in different parts of the island. It was from their number that the mayors and other major officials of the new towns would be drawn.

Under Saravia, villagers worked alongside Spanish troops to build new roads and improve mountain trails. The Spanish also initiated what today might be called development programs to teach the townspeople new trades and to assist in the cultivation of their plots.¹⁴⁷ Some local people had already begun planting corn besides the traditional root crops, and instruction in horticultural methods was extended to many outside the Hagatña area. In addition to the pigs being raised on the island, the Spanish had introduced other animals—sheep and goats, chickens, pigeons, geese and ducks. Chamorros were beginning to learn how to care for these new sources of protein. In 1680 there were an estimated thirty head of cattle on the island; as their number increased in the future, they would become an important farm animal and an occasional item on the menu for feasts. There were even seven

horses on Guam, more for the use of the military than the farmers.¹⁴⁸ European farm animals and crops were then just beginning to become an integral part of life in the Marianas as altered by the Spanish.

Tobacco had become a favorite crop by this time and was quickly becoming the usual medium of exchange. One Jesuit wrote:

People have become so addicted to tobacco that men and women, boys and girls, walk around with pipes. In the past their only substitute for money was iron..., but now they value tobacco above all else, and tobacco has become the common currency with which one can buy and obtain anything. For a hen we pay two tobacco leaves, and for one leaf of tobacco a man will work all day.¹⁴⁹

Cotton, too, was introduced as a crop about this time. The plant grew well on the island, to the joy of the missionaries, who hoped that before long local people would be making their own clothes. Those older members of the militia, who had been selected for their skills, taught some of the islanders how to weave on a loom. Before long, weaving was passed on to others. "In a short time all learned the art," wrote one Jesuit.¹⁵⁰ The interest in clothes, something that San Vitores had fruitlessly tried to promote ten years earlier, was not merely a concession to the missionaries' standards of modesty. Clothes had become fashionable in the eyes of the people on Guam, just as they eventually would to people all over the Pacific. It would not be long, the missionaries anticipated, before the last of the people in the Marianas were clothed.

The Problem of the Military

Jose Quiroga had arrived in June 1679 to assist the mission at the suggestion of the Superior General of the Jesuits in Rome. He was identified on the passenger list as an “adventurer,” and so had to pay his own way; but he came highly recommended, this man who could not decide whether he wanted to be a monk or a soldier. As an officer, he had served with distinction in Flanders, but he had also spent time in solitude and prayer, a throwback to the monastics of the desert in the days of early Christianity. Described by the Jesuits as a man of “modest intellect” and probably of limited imagination as well, Quiroga was undeniably a man of high religious ideals and strong moral conviction.¹⁵¹ During his first year in the Marianas, he served as a junior officer in the military with virtually no say in policy. Then, in 1680, when Juan Antonio de Salas unexpectedly departed for the Philippines, Quiroga was made interim governor for a year until the arrival of the newly appointed governor, Antonio de Saravia. For two years after this, Quiroga served as military commander under the man who was known for promoting peace and good will among the people of the Marianas. Although historians have almost universally represented the two men as opposites—Saravia as an engaging and sympathetic administrator, and Quiroga as the brutal and unsparing man of arms—the two shared a fervent faith and a high sense of honor. The pair proved to be a surprisingly good fit, as much to the benefit of the local population as the Spanish.

With Guam pacified, the Spanish hoped to extend their rule to the northern islands. In late 1680, Quiroga with some of his troops set out for Rota, long the hideaway of fugitives from Guam. There the Spanish met with resistance, but they pushed on, inflicting a few casualties and burning houses belonging to the people of southern Guam who had taken refuge on Rota. Quiroga rounded up 150 people, all of whom were taken back to Guam for resettlement. Five or six of these

men, judged responsible for some of the earlier killings, were executed.¹⁵² With this, Quiroga subdued Rota and brought one more island under effective Spanish control.

Yet, Quiroga's main problem was his own troops, not Chamorro resistance. Morale among the Spanish troops was so low, one of the Jesuits wrote, that at the arrival of the galleon in 1680 the entire militia wanted to leave in a body.¹⁵³ The following year, in fact, five of the troops were driven to such desperation that they clandestinely sailed off to Manila in the launch used to offload goods from the yearly ship.¹⁵⁴ The soldiers were miserable. As one Jesuit put it, "They curse the Marianas in their desperation and move heaven and earth to get sent away from here."¹⁵⁵ Quiroga did not improve matters at all when, during his first year as commander, he cut the rations of the troops and began to demand assistance from the local people in feeding the military force. In doing so, he managed to offend the three major parties on Guam: the troops themselves, whose food had always been guaranteed; the local people, who were being asked not only to tolerate the soldiers but to feed them; and even the Jesuits, who saw this as cutting into the local resources used to support their own work.¹⁵⁶ But the real problem with the military went far deeper than food rations.

The military force that was to accompany and protect the missionaries had always been an uncertain factor. The 31 member of the original "militia" who arrived with San Vitores in 1668 had been vetted by him and chosen for their exemplary Christian lives rather than for their soldierly skills. Until 1674 these men remained under the direct authority of the Jesuits, who monitored their personal behavior and issued instructions not to fire upon the islanders except in self-defense. Serious misdeeds, if any, would have been rare.

With the unexpected arrival of Esplana and his assumption of command over the garrison in 1674, the military began to operate independently of the Jesuits. Moreover, the troops who arrived after this time were of a radically different type from the initial group selected by San Vitores. Of the more than 80 troops who arrived in the Marianas between 1675 and 1680, it is probably safe to say that few would have been held up as exemplars of Christian virtue. Few enough, for that matter, would have even qualified as well trained soldiers. The Jesuits, who at first were happy to have these reinforcements to protect their vulnerable new mission, soon began complaining about the excesses of the troops. They blamed the soldiers for unnecessary violence and giving bad example, especially for taking

sexual liberties with the girls in the mission school. Some of the marriages between soldiers and local women that were multiplying during those years were the result of the missionaries' attempts to regularize such unions. But the Jesuits' insistence that such relationships be blessed by marriage was lenient compared with the response of one of the early military commanders, who had two of his men garrotted to death for their undisciplined behavior.¹⁵⁷

The conduct of the troops remained a problem throughout the late 1670s. Indeed, it worsened in time. If we are to judge from the missionary letters, the soldiers were no longer content with seducing girls in the mission school but had begun to rape village women. By 1680, the troops were using their position to take what they wanted from the local people. "The thefts that the soldiers have carried out among the Indians, and the other extortions, have been endless," one Jesuit wrote.¹⁵⁸ The same Jesuit also accused the Spanish military commander of sending his men over to the rectory to steal goods from the priests. This priest was not alone in excoriating the troops, whose latest recruits were, in his view, no better than "criminals from Mexico," men who were "Spaniard in name only" but in fact "cowardly, spoiled, and good for very little."¹⁵⁹ By this time, the missionaries, who had once counted on the militia for the survival of the mission, regarded the troops as "unspeakable" and their long list of crimes as the greatest obstacle to their work of christianizing the local people.

Much of the explanation for this turnabout might lie in the way soldiers were selected for the Marianas. Many of the soldiers seem to have been recruited on shipboard from among the passengers on the galleon who were seeking their fortunes overseas. Captains paid to recruit and train troops for the Marianas and the Philippines often pocketed the money and stayed at home, appointing substitutes to muster whomever they could from the ship's complement to fill the requisite positions.¹⁶⁰ In the worst cases, the men selected might be convicts en route to prison in the Philippines who had been offered the option of serving in the Marianas garrison rather than completing their prison sentence. In most instances, however, the men signing on for the positions were young adventurers, untrained and with no strong sense of duty, looking for anything that might advance their own interests. In this they were not much different from some of their commanders and a few of the later governors. As the years went on, the balance in numbers tilted from Filipinos, who made up most of the corps that accompanied San Vitores,

toward Mexicans. By the end of the century two of the three companies of troops in the Marianas were from Mexico, while the remaining one was from Pamapanga in the Philippines.

The soldiers, lured as they were by the prospect of making a fortune abroad, were bound to be dissatisfied with what they found in the Marianas. As the size of the garrison in the colony expanded to 115 troops, the number of salaried positions allotted in the annual subsidy had only increased to 40.¹⁶¹ This meant that the troops received only about a third of the salary they should have been receiving. Some argued that Mexicans and Filipinos could get along with less than Spaniards, so the budget could be kept low as an economy measure.¹⁶² Others, more realistic in their appraisal of the situation, predicted that the slow impoverishment of the troops would hurt morale and diminish the effectiveness of the garrison.

The response of the troops was to find support wherever they could. That might explain the growing tendency of the soldiers to begin preying on the local people just as it could account for the increasing number of marriages to local women. An island wife would provide, besides sexual satisfaction, an alternative to the barracks table when the subsidy failed to arrive and rations were reduced. Married troops could have relied strongly on their wife's family for support at such times. This, in turn, would have made desertion from the Spanish forces a more attractive option when lances started flying.

As the number of soldiers increased, so did their poverty. Frustrated in their search for the bounty they expected to find overseas, denied what they needed even to support themselves, and bereft of the high ideals of service to God and king that saw others through bad times, the troops in the Marianas were understandably demoralized. Such were the troops that Quiroga, fervent in his devotion to his religion and his country, sought to discipline when he became commander of the Spanish forces. His heavy-handed attempts to instill in them his own high ideals were bound to fail; indeed, they would provoke a strong reaction in the years to come. Meanwhile, the development program undertaken by Saravia and Quiroga during the early 1680s at least removed the danger of idleness; it kept the troops occupied with road improvement around the island and construction work in the new towns. But the problem of the military was one that would remain unresolved during this period; the troops would continue to be exploiters even as they were exploited by their own authorities.

The Spanish Push Northward

The Spanish had already made a start in securing the northern islands when Quiroga and his troops made a surprise visit to Rota in late 1680. He captured several of the leaders of the resistance, some of whom were later executed, and rounded up 150 refugees from Guam for resettlement on their home island. A few months later, in April 1681, Quiroga and his troops were back on Rota—this time in pursuit of people from Inapsan who had the effrontery to burn down their church and rectory on Guam and then, after fleeing to Rota, had begun to prey off the Christian community there. With the help of some of the local people, Quiroga drove the fugitives back into the hills until most of them surrendered and finally agreed to return to Guam.¹⁶³

Even on Rota, long known to be the favored hideaway of fugitives from Guam, there was a growing Christian community served by a solitary Jesuit. At last, with the removal of most of the refugees from Guam, the time seemed opportune to expand missionary efforts there. In March 1682, two priests (Frs. Coomans and Boranga) and a Jesuit brother (Br. DuBois) were sent to Rota. They made their first settlement at Sosa (present-day Songsong), where they found a solid core of support for the missionaries, they reported.¹⁶⁴ After a church and residence were built in Sosa, the Spanish established another town in Agusan in the northern part of the island. The Jesuits wrote with enthusiasm of the 400 communicants on the island and the dozens of baptisms they were performing.¹⁶⁵ Meanwhile, the reduction of the island proceeded much as Guam's had two or three years earlier. The houses that formerly had been scattered at random along the shore were now arranged in neat rows, one of the Jesuits wrote.¹⁶⁶ The concentration of the island population into the two newly formed towns was well underway.

Even if the greater segment of the island had accepted the missionaries by this time, there were elements of the population who strongly resisted. Still at large



Map of Rota drawn by Fr. Alanzo Lopez in 1671.

were “three patricides living there, whom the people of Rota have not been able to capture despite their best efforts,” wrote one priest.¹⁶⁷ When a spear was hurled at the door of the rectory one evening, the people of the town reacted immediately; they cleared the brush around the mission and thereafter posted a guard every evening to watch over the priest.¹⁶⁸ The new village built in the north of the island was more troubled. The pastor there reported that his church had been burned down twice during the year. Even so, his letter still overflows with optimism concerning the strength of Christianity on Rota. “The dead receive Christian burial, and the sick are brought to the church for the sacraments on the shoulders of relatives,” he wrote.¹⁶⁹

With Rota settled and churches established there, the Jesuits immediately began to move still further northward. In early 1682 the mission superior, Fr. Manuel Solorzano, set out for the northern islands with a military escort. The party visited Tinian and Aguigan, where Solorzano was able to baptize 300 infants and instruct some adults. On Saipan, though, Solorzano met firm resistance, including a near ambush of his party, and was unable to accomplish much on the island. The Spanish were forced to return to Guam rather than sail north as they had hoped because of unfavorable winds.¹⁷⁰

The lack of adequate transportation was a lingering issue in the colony at this time. In early 1683, Governor Saravia had two ocean-going vessels (“long boats,” the missionary letters called them) built for a new attempt to sail north and subdue Saipan. With Saravia went two Jesuit priests hoping to resume work on Saipan and Tinian after the long absence of missionaries on these islands.¹⁷¹ Once again the weather conditions proved unfavorable and the governor was forced to turn back after just two days sailing.¹⁷² Several months later, in the late summer of 1683, Saravia tried again but had no more success than before.

The persistent difficulties of the Spanish in sailing to the northern islands underscored the problem of procuring the vessels the colony needed. For years authorities in the Marianas had been requesting a small ship—a *balandra* or *patache*—that could sail to Manila and back as needed. Not all the galleons from Mexico stopped at Guam, even though they were under royal orders to do so. This was painfully clear to the missionaries and the troops who watched the *San Telmo* sail past the northern tip of Guam in 1681.¹⁷³ Those ships that did put in off Guam were usually in a rush to reach Manila before the end of the trading season. Otherwise, the silver carried by the galleons would have been unspent and the profits on the Chinese trade goods that would have been brought to Mexico on the return run unrealized.¹⁷⁴ More than once a ship that had just put into Guam rushed off before offloading the subsidy and supplies for the colony, leaving the Spanish in the Marianas without provisions and pay.

Regular ship service between Guam and Manila would shorten contact time to a matter of weeks rather than the long months required by the voyage to America and back. But the small ship that could provide a regular link between Guam and Manila was slow in coming. This vessel had been petitioned by Guam and approved by Spain, but the Governor of the Philippines had been dragging his heels in building the ship.¹⁷⁵ Once the boat was built, there remained the further challenge of persuading the Governor of the Philippines to dispatch it to the Marianas each year, as Spain ordered. After delays of all sorts, the ship was finally outfitted and yearly service was scheduled to begin with its dispatch from Manila in 1681, but the *balandra* (a single-masted sloop) never reached Guam. Soon after putting out to sea, it suffered damage in a storm and was forced to return to Manila.¹⁷⁶ The next trip to Guam was not attempted until early 1683. This voyage, too, came close to being aborted when the crew all but mutinied as soon as they saw the rough seas that awaited them outside the Straits of San Bernardino. This time, however, the

ship successfully reached its destination, although it was soon afterwards wrecked by a storm while lying at anchor off Guam.¹⁷⁷ Even so, the supply ship carried back to the Marianas a man who would, for reasons of his own, ensure that the ship traffic ran regularly between Manila and Guam during the next ten years.

The Final Uprising

When Antonio de Saravia died in November 1683, Damian Esplana presented his sealed orders from Spain appointing him as the next governor of the Marianas. Esplana had returned to Guam, after a seven year absence, on the supply ship that arrived just a few months before Saravia's death. It was he who reported to authorities in the Philippines the recalcitrant sailors on that ship and had them replaced by a new crew; and it was he who commanded the ship on its voyage to Guam.

One of Esplana's first official acts as governor was to send Quiroga north to complete the conquest of Tinian and Saipan. The Jesuits were delighted at this move. It was the opportunity they had long sought "to restore the faith which had failed in two islands [Tinian and Saipan], which... had lacked for twelve years all instruction and the necessary means of attaining eternal salvation."¹⁷⁸ As Quiroga prepared to launch a new expedition to the north, two priests, Fr. Peter Coomans and Fr. Mathias Kuklein, were assigned to accompany it. They were to become the pastors of Tinian and Saipan, two of the islands that had been neglected for so long.

In March 1684, the expeditionary force left Guam with 76 Spanish troops, Quiroga at their head, and at least as many Chamorro allies sailing in the newly built long boats and a flotilla of local canoes.¹⁷⁹ The Spanish were welcomed peacefully on Tinian, but at Saipan they met with strong resistance. Dozens of canoes came out to prevent their landing, and a barrage of sling stones greeted the Spanish as they came ashore.¹⁸⁰ In the fighting that followed, one or two Saipanese and a Spanish soldier were killed before the local forces were driven inland. Over the next few days the Spanish troops pushed northward on Saipan, burning houses and taking booty along the way. Now and then they encountered resistance, but most villages seemed ready to make peace. The others, one of the priests wrote, "were laid waste with iron and fire." The same source notes that one villager who offered resistance to the Spanish "was cut down with an axe and his body hung by

the foot from a tree to inspire fear.”¹⁸¹ The troops then crossed the island and moved southward to force other villages to submit. Only at the village of Araiao in the southwest of the island did the Spanish encounter any real resistance, but they soon put the warriors to flight and returned with the head of one of the leaders of the resistance as a trophy. Confident that the island was subdued at last, the Spanish left Fr. Coomans there to become the new pastor of Saipan.¹⁸²

Once the campaign ended, the Spanish soldiers were put to work salvaging the guns from the shipwrecked galleon *Concepcion*; their task was to raise the ship’s 34 cannon that might be used to defend Spanish settlements.¹⁸³ Quiroga then sent off a detachment of 25 soldiers to demand the submission of those remote and sparsely inhabited islands to the north, while he began laying plans for the construction of the new fort that he intended to build on Saipan.

With Quiroga and his expeditionary force away in the northern islands, the greatly reduced garrison on Guam presented an inviting target for attack. A chief from the village of Apurguan (near present day Tamuning) by the name of Yura rallied some of the other villages, beginning with Ritidian in the north and Pago in the east, and a number of disaffected individuals to strike at the fort in Hagatña and wipe out the Spanish once and for all.¹⁸⁴ News of the uprising spread rapidly through the villages of Guam. As it happened, most of the parish priests were already on their way to Hagatña to attend a Jesuit meeting and so they made it safely to the stockade before their own townspeople could turn on them. Only Fr. Teofilo de Angelis, the pastor of Ritidian, failed to reach safety. A local chief who harbored a grudge against the priest for insisting that his daughter be properly married in church sent two young men to slay Angelis as he was about to sail to Rota. The assailants seized the priest and hanged him from the mast of the canoe, afterwards stripping his body and casting it into the sea. The same local chief, we are told, became one of the main instigators of the attack on the Spanish in Hagatña.¹⁸⁵

Yura and his allies mustered a considerable force, but they were seeking a united response from the inhabitants of an island that was much too divided to provide that. The Spanish had already made strong ties with the local village populations through their converts, some of them prepared to fight on the side of the Spanish. Yura and his supporters tried to convince Ignacio Hineti to join the resistance forces, but he adamantly refused. The boys attending the mission school, and often their families as well, sided with the priests and their Spanish protectors. On the other

hand, Yura and his followers sought to win over support from within the stockade by trying to persuade some of the Spanish soldiers married to island women to kill the governor or at least smuggle weapons to the Chamorro attackers.¹⁸⁶ The battle lines in this insurrection, therefore, were not nearly as sharply defined as they are sometimes represented.

On July 13, Yura and his allies struck. He and 40 others, all carrying concealed weapons, entered the stockade on the pretense of attending mass and attacked the unsuspecting Spaniards. They killed the sentinels, seriously wounded the governor and left him for dead on the plaza, and broke into several houses and put the occupants to the sword. Two Jesuits were slain and four others wounded in the melee. Fr. Manuel de Solorzano, the mission superior, was stabbed several times and had a hand severed in the initial attack, but it was a Chamorro mission assistant sympathetic to Yura who supplied the *coup de grace* with a knife thrust to the throat. Br. Balthasar Du Bois, who had spent five years in the mission building churches, also died in the attack. The boarding students from the mission school captured one of the assailants and stabbed him to death with the knives they had gotten from their homes. In all, four Spanish soldiers were killed and seventeen more badly wounded. Yet, the 50 surviving troops finally organized themselves enough to kill Yura, drive off the attackers and secure the gates of the stockade.¹⁸⁷

When the hostile forces returned a few days later in even greater numbers to renew their assault on the stockade, Ignacio Hineti and his squadron were there to meet them. Although badly outnumbered by the attackers, Hineti captured and killed the man who had replaced Yura as leader, afterwards cutting off his head and putting it on a post.¹⁸⁸ Still, the hostile forces pressed the attack, burning the church and rectory and threatening to breach the walls of the stockade. To encourage the downcast Spanish troops, even the priests took up arms, one of the Jesuits proudly wrote, all the while exhorting the soldiers to recall “the honor and glory of God, their Christian responsibilities, the service they would be doing to the King in fighting as brave Spaniards.”¹⁸⁹ At the end of the day the attacking force pulled back and launched canoes to rally the other villages on the island and to invite the people of the northern islands to join them. To the other villages on Guam word went out that the Spanish detachment in the north had been massacred, while the people on the northern islands were told that the garrison on Guam was all but entirely destroyed.¹⁹⁰ Then both sides settled in for another long siege—the third in Hagatña since the arrival of the Spanish.

The uprising reached well beyond Guam. The two Jesuit priests working on Rota also fell victims to the revolt. Fr. Augustin Strobach, a Jesuit working on Rota, set out for Guam at the first report of the uprising, but was forced to return to Rota under the pursuit of enemy canoes from Guam. He soon set out once again, this time to the north to bring word of the uprising to Quiroga, but he was apprehended soon after landing at Tinian and beaten to death. His colleague, Fr. Karl Boranga, continued his pastoral work on Rota for another month after Strobach's death before he, too, was slain by people who had sailed from Tinian.¹⁹¹

While the Chamorro forces on Guam redoubled their efforts to take the Spanish stockade, the general insurrection spread to Saipan, where Quiroga, still unaware of what had taken place, continued work on the fortification of that island. Only after the detachment of Spanish troops he had left at Tinian had been massacred and his boats had been set afire did he realize what was afoot.¹⁹² The Spanish commander must have despaired of the safe return of the company of soldiers who had sailed north with Fr. Coomans some weeks earlier. What Quiroga could not have known was that while the priest would survive a plot against him only to be seized and murdered after his return to Saipan, his military escort would be killed almost to the man.

Meanwhile, a combined force of warriors from Tinian and Saipan launched a massive attack on Quiroga's men on Saipan and drove them back into the unfinished fort. Quiroga, never a man to fight a defensive battle, sallied out against the enemy, pressing them so hard that the attackers turned and scattered. They were soon back, however, and the siege continued for weeks, with the Chamorro forces making three charges upon the fort during the most intense period of fighting. The Spanish lost four men in the fighting, while the attackers suffered "considerable losses."¹⁹³ By this time, the Spanish had just 35 troops left of the original detachment of 75 that Quiroga had brought with him. Finally, late one night, Quiroga found an opportunity to slip his men down to the shore where they boarded canoes and sailed to the rescue of the governor and his beleaguered garrison on Guam.¹⁹⁴

Upon his arrival at Guam in November, Quiroga found the stockade still unbreached, but the defenders demoralized and exhausted from the four month siege. Casualties had been great, especially during the intense fighting in late July and August, and several of the Filipino soldiers married to Guamanian women had deserted.¹⁹⁵ Governor Esplana, who had once been regarded as the terror of the islands, had become a casualty of a different sort; in the course of the long

siege, he had lost his taste for combat and his courage, becoming an indecisive and ineffectual leader.¹⁹⁶ In the face of these internal problems, the defenders probably could not have held out against far superior numbers as long as they did without the courageous support of their loyal Chamorro militia. Quiroga, however, had lost nothing of his own fearful reputation among the people of Guam, and at the first sight of him and his troops the insurgents abandoned their positions in panic and took to the mountains for refuge. Again and again in the months that followed Quiroga set out in pursuit of the rebels, burning their towns and executing those whom he captured, until once again peace was established in the islands—the kind of peace that is born of desperation and weariness and sustained by force of arms.¹⁹⁷

How did the islands, which had just experienced a period of relative peace and seeming prosperity, become aflame in insurrection in a single year? Yura and at least one of his lieutenants, whose daughter had been forced into church marriage against her father's wishes, had personal grievances against the Spanish. They had no trouble finding allies—there were presumably many others who chafed under the Spanish control that had been imposed on Guam and Rota since the reduction. Moreover, the more recent recruits among the Spanish troops, who were frustrated by strict discipline and the poor compensation they received, had already won a reputation for rapaciousness among the general population.¹⁹⁸ Their abuses would have only added to the complaints and strengthened the desire for revenge. When it appeared that the garrison, already halved in numbers during the expedition north, had suffered heavy losses, even parties who might have been reluctant to risk taking on the Spanish saw this as an opportunity to restore what they had lost.¹⁹⁹

The military engagements, more intense and longer in duration than ever before, included two long sieges—one of the stockade in Hagatña and the other of the unfinished fort on Saipan—as well as Quiroga's march through Saipan against hostile villages and his retaliatory expeditions on Guam after the siege there was lifted. Casualties on both sides were heavy when compared with previous outbreaks of violence. Six Jesuits—half of all who lost their lives during the entire period of the establishment of the mission—were killed that year. Quiroga lost about 40 of the 75 soldiers he had brought north with him: twenty of the men he had sent to the far northern islands; seventeen on Tinian, who were massacred as they were raising the guns from a wrecked galleon; and three or four more on Saipan. On Guam, Spanish losses were fewer: four soldiers in the initial attack on the stockade and perhaps one or two after that. Desertions numbered at least five and perhaps more.

Total losses among the Spanish troops would have been between 45 and 50, or roughly one-third of the total garrison of 140.

Chamorro losses seem to have been comparable. Five deaths were recorded in Quiroga's campaign around Saipan and two men were killed in Asuncion.²⁰⁰ During the siege of the fort on Saipan, "many rebels were slain," according to one account, but this must be read in the context of the generally light losses in island battles.²⁰¹ Three men, including Yura, were killed in the siege at Hagatña, but the number was almost certainly higher than this; ten or fifteen might be a reasonable guess, given the cautious way warfare was conducted in the islands. In all, there may have been 30 or 35 casualties among the Chamorro insurgents.

With a total of perhaps 80 lives lost in a single year, the insurrection of 1684 was easily the deadliest since the arrival of the Spanish; certainly none afterwards would rival it.

The Blessings of Peace

Peace may have brought many blessings to the island, but it also served to underscore the growing differences between the Jesuits and the new governor. The missionary priests, who ten years earlier lauded Esplana for his aggressive military strategy and his readiness to force the submission of recalcitrant villages, once thought of him as the savior of the mission. Now they were openly critical of his boastful and self-serving statements, pronouncements that seemed to mask his ever more inept government.²⁰² The man who, a few years before he was nearly killed in the siege, had marched boldly into hostile villages now seemed pathologically fearful. One Jesuit claimed that the governor seriously considered poisoning the drinking wells of Chamorros to stave off any danger of further insurrection.²⁰³ A year later Esplana sent out a company of troops under an adjutant to investigate rumors that the people of Guam were planning another uprising. The troops were ordered to "shoot at sight any enemy islander," one of the missionaries wrote. The soldiers complied and "bagged two children aged eight and nine years, two women who were ill, and an infirm old man."²⁰⁴ The adjutant, who was probably a new recruit, quickly learned to moderate his methods; at his next encounter he brought back seven children as prisoners instead of shooting them outright. In his face-to-face dealings with local people Esplana could be lenient to the point of servility, but when working through others he was capable of casual cruelty. All of this gave rise to the biting remark of one Jesuit: "Indeed it is a miracle that we should be alive at all... with his slovenly, madcap rule."²⁰⁵

Since his near death in the 1684 uprising, Esplana seems to have retreated into paranoia, finding relief when he could in unmitigated self-gratification. One Jesuit mentions, in a juicy bit of gossip, that a Chamorro man from the northern islands who killed a Spanish soldier in 1684 was pardoned because of the pleas of

his twelve-year-old niece, but the pardon was granted on condition that the girl be placed at the sole disposal of the governor.²⁰⁶ Yet, Esplana's use of his administrative authority to obtain girls to satisfy his lust was less serious than his obsession with profits on the galleon trade that consumed his interest ever since his return from Manila.

Esplana's attempts to maximize his investment in the galleon trade did nothing to improve the deteriorating condition of the troops in the garrison. They were already being underpaid, since their number continued to increase much more rapidly than the annual allotment for their salaries. To make matters worse, the troops were shortchanged on even their reduced salaries. Rather than pay his men in currency from the annual subsidy that was sent on the galleon, Esplana offered them goods from the supply ship at heavily inflated prices. Now that the governor had the small ship, he could purchase the items need for the colony from Manila rather than from Mexico. The goods were purchased at much cheaper Manila prices but sold to the troops at Mexico prices.²⁰⁷ The governor's strategy, even by this time, was to attempt to capture as much of the entire subsidy as possible so that it could be carried on the return voyage of the supply ship to Manila where it would be invested in that year's galleon run. The governor's salary of 1,650 pesos a year was just a fraction of the annual subsidy of 20,000 pesos; the trick was to get hold of the rest so that it could bring lucrative returns of three or four times the amount invested in a year's time.²⁰⁸

For two years in succession, 1686 and 1687, there were no ships putting in at Guam; neither the galleon nor the smaller ship from Manila brought supplies during that time. The Jesuits were suspicious that Esplana was somehow to blame for the desperate need in the colony.²⁰⁹ When, in 1688, Esplana suddenly departed for Manila in the *patache*, the missionaries assumed that he intended "to put away the money he had amassed."²¹⁰ Soon after reaching Manila, Esplana was arrested for deserting his post but was finally acquitted of all charges. Meanwhile, Quiroga took over as interim governor and seized the opportunity to discipline the troops and force them to abandon "the licentious life to which they were accustomed."²¹¹ The troops, who had been forced to pimp and procure for Esplana and then were being punished for it all by Quiroga, had reached the end of their patience. They rebelled against Quiroga, threw him in the dungeon and were making plans to execute him when the Jesuit mission superior, Fr. Bouwens, pleaded for the life of the commander and succeeded in obtaining his release.²¹² Esplana returned to

Guam the following year and continued to serve as governor, at least nominally, while he spent nearly all his time in Umatac taking care of his shipping affairs.

When the galleon *Nuestra Señora del Pilar* went aground off the southern shore of Guam in 1690, the 200 survivors needed to be provided for on the island. The survivors included 80 convicts bound for the Philippines who were soon pressed into service providing food for the rest. Desperate at the thought of a life of forced labor in the Marianas, several of them plotted to steal the supply ship from Manila and sail off to freedom. When the plot was discovered, twenty of the convicts were summarily executed.²¹³

Ever since the end of the 1684 uprising the missionaries had been pushing the governor to finish the reduction of the northern islands, but he had been putting this off to attend to business matters of his own. Finally, however, in early 1691 he set sail with Quiroga and 80 troops. The expedition made it as far as Rota, where the governor spoke to the people from his boat, visibly trembling as he implored them for peace. Then Esplana ordered the expedition back to Guam, claiming that the weather had not been fair enough to permit him to visit the other islands in the north.²¹⁴ To the Jesuits, who had very likely anticipated something along the lines of the farce that occurred, this was further confirmation, if any were needed, that Esplana had indeed become "the scourge of the mission."²¹⁵

Meanwhile, an even more drastic reduction was being proposed by some Spanish officials in other parts of the realm. A recommendation had reached the Crown that the entire population of the Marianas be moved to the Philippines so that the people could be better (and more cheaply) cared for. Under this plan the whole colony would be concentrated in the seat of Spanish colonial rule to the west. Fr. Morales countered with a petition that the islands not be abandoned and that Jesuits be allowed to continue their mission. Indeed, a memorial to the pope around this time recommended that the Marianas be turned into a episcopal see with Fr. Antonio Xaramillo, the Jesuit procurator in Manila, as the first bishop. The church in Hagatña, which had already been rebuilt several times since 1668, would be replaced by a cathedral.²¹⁶ In the end, however, nothing came of either proposal: the mission remained in the Marianas, but without a bishop to oversee it.

Despite the ongoing tensions among the different components that are lumped together as "Spanish"—the governor, the missionaries, and the troops—activity in the colony continued much as it had before. The garrison had received another 40 men in 1686 to replace those lost during the uprising and 20 more three years after

that to bring the number of troops to 160.²¹⁷ Eight more Jesuits arrived in 1689 to reinforce the mission staff and to increase the number of Jesuits in the Marianas to twenty, its maximum during the entire early Spanish period. Their number, which had been gradually increasing over the years, would level off at about fifteen during the remainder of the early Spanish period.²¹⁸ Meanwhile, of course, the local population, then estimated at below 10,000, continued to drop.

On Guam churches were continually being rebuilt after the typhoons that ravaged the islands then as now. Occasionally new towns might replace old ones as settlement patterns shifted over the years. In 1690, for instance, a church and rectory was being built in Fina, an interior settlement that was on its way to replacing Mapupun as a full-fledged town.²¹⁹ Inarajan, too, was close to getting its own church. The missionaries proudly wrote of the progress that had been made among the island population, notwithstanding the uprising some years earlier. The boys and girls in the mission schools cut an impressive figure, the boys in their white linen pants and blue vests and the girls in their white blouses and skirts that they themselves had made. Women would come to church not only fully dressed but wearing veils as well, borrowing from others when they didn't have a veil of their own. At funerals black cloth stitched with crosses was often draped over the bier—a far cry from the days in which the skulls of the dead were preserved and venerated.²²⁰ The Jesuit mission superior, after reciting the changes that he had seen in the islands in recent years, gushed: “These people are better Christians than some of the old families in the main cities of Spain.”²²¹

Perhaps the change was best symbolized in the solemn enthronement of the statue of Our Lady in the church in Pago in 1689. The statue, possibly salvaged from a shipwreck, was reputed to have wondrously emerged from the sea and was venerated from the earliest years of the mission. During the 1684 uprising the statue was taken from the church and kept in a hut for safekeeping. Chipped in places and by then known as Santa Marian Kamalen, the image was then returned to Hagatña for a few years until it was transferred to Pago, where it was said to have been originally discovered. The ceremonies at the enthronement of the statue included a procession led by Ignacio Hineti, Antonio Ayhi and other prominent Chamorro Christians, a solemn mass, the obligatory feast followed by dances and games, and musket salutes fired by the troops. This was a fitting tribute, cultural and religious, to the statue that would come to symbolize, more than anything else, the encounter of faith and culture on Guam.²²²

The Reduction Concluded

When Esplana died in August 1694, Quiroga became the interim governor until a replacement was sent. Quiroga seized this opportunity to pursue the long-promised and often delayed reduction of the islands north of Guam with their estimated population of 6,000 or 7,000.²²³ He began with Rota, long a haunt of rebels from Guam but peaceful for several years now. Just one month after Esplana's death, Quiroga and 50 of his troops sailed to Rota where the people from one village received them in a friendly fashion. Those from the more distant village, however, fled inland and hid away in the mountains until Quiroga flushed them out, destroyed their weapons and brought many of them—26 canoes filled with people—back to Guam where they could be better looked after and their children educated in a mission school.²²⁴


A year later, in July 1695, Quiroga set out once again, this time with a force of 80 men including a unit of the Chamorro militia, to complete the reduction of Tinian and Saipan. At Tinian, Quiroga found the people hurrying off to the nearby island of Aguiguan, a precipitous citadel atop steep cliffs that offered a far better defense than their own island. When the Spanish forces approached the island the next morning, the Tinian warriors hurled a barrage of stones and spears at the vessel, leaving some of the Spanish troops dead and several more wounded. To avoid further casualties, Quiroga withdrew and steered for Saipan to await the twenty canoes carrying his Chamorro allies that had been delayed by bad weather off Rota. At Saipan the Spanish had a much easier time. After putting down the token resistance offered them, the Spanish troops chased the Saipanese warriors inland and then spent several days flushing them out of hiding. Quiroga assured the people that the Spanish would take no reprisals on the people for anything they had done in the past; he asked them only to allow the missionaries to work there in peace. If they were willing to do so, they would be allowed to continue to live on their own island.



When Quiroga returned to Tinian, he found his Chamorro allies had finally caught up with him but the island was deserted. By this time the entire population had fled to nearby Aguiguan where they intended to defend themselves against the Spanish. Quiroga sent messengers to assure the Tinian people that they would not be punished for their attack on the Spanish forces a week or two earlier. When the people remained where they were, Quiroga burned down their houses on Tinian as a warning. But still there was no response, so the Spanish blockaded the island to deny food and water to the defenders. Finally, Quiroga decided to make a direct assault on the island; his men scaled the cliffs while others covered their ascent with musket fire from the boat. By the time the Spanish troops reached the heights, the battle was over. With several of the Tinian warriors already killed in the fighting, the remainder surrendered to the Spanish. A few men, those who were implicated in past crimes and had little reason to expect mercy from the Spanish, threw themselves off the cliffs into the sea. Two others who had been responsible for the killing of a priest some years earlier were executed by the Spanish. Quiroga announced that the remainder of the Tinian people were to be relocated on Guam once they had gathered whatever food and possessions they could carry from their island. Soon after this a flotilla of Tinian canoes sailed off to Guam, and the stream of canoes bound for Guam continued throughout the rest of the year. Some of the people fled to the northernmost islands of the chain to escape the enforced resettlement, but no one dared remain on Tinian.²²⁵

With pastors at work on Rota and Saipan, the two authorized population centers for the northern islands, the task of concentrating the Chamorro people into areas served by priests and subject to Spanish control was nearly complete. The people of Gani, the eight small islands at the northern end of the Marianas chain, signaled their readiness to comply with whatever the Spanish wanted them to do. More than 300 of a total population of perhaps 2,000 soon resettled on Saipan. Only when these relocated people began to slip back to their own islands did the Jesuit pastor of Saipan call upon the new governor, Jose Madrazo, to organize a final expedition to complete the reduction of the islands in the far north. In September 1698, twelve Spanish soldiers and a fleet of 112 Chamorro canoes sailed north to resettle the people of Gani. Impressed at the size of the fleet and the number of Chamorros who arrived at their shore, the people of Gani readily complied with the directive to relocate their families on Guam. Ignacio Nu'un, who was himself relocated from Agrigan before becoming a Christian, reassured the evacuees with tales of his own rewarding experiences.

In the end, 1,900 people were relocated from the northernmost islands—many of them temporarily settled on Saipan until they could be moved to the southern part of Guam. Once they were relocated, the governor did everything possible to accommodate them, even settling them in larger villages than the ones they had left. Despite the pain they experienced in leaving their home islands, “he wanted them to realize that they had been forced to leave their homes only for the good of their souls,” one of the Jesuits wrote.²²⁶ With their settlement on Guam in 1699, some 30 years after the arrival of the first missionaries, the reduction of the Marianas was at last complete.²²⁷



“Spanish-Chamorro Wars” in Summary

The Spanish missionary venture in the Marianas began with great promise in 1668 when a local chieftain offered a warm gesture of welcome that was reciprocated by gifts from the visitors. Somehow this peaceful overture to what should have been an era of peace and plenty was transformed into the troublesome period that historians have come to refer to as the “Spanish-Chamorro Wars.”

Popular presentations of this early period of Marianas history often seem to assume that the goals and values of both parties, Spanish and Chamorro, were so irreconcilably opposed to one another from the very outset that a clash was inevitable. The history of the period, in that view, would simply be the unfolding of the preordained conflict. But history is by definition fluid: the principal actors and their motives change, and events are bound to reflect the elements of this change throughout the story. In this piece I have tried to honor that principle by drawing attention to the dynamics of change that are often ignored: how the motives for violence may have changed over time, how the Spanish response gradually altered,

how the composition of the Spanish military changed and what difference this might have made, how the Chamorro perception of what the Spanish had to offer was modified, and how allegiances shifted in time.²²⁸

The causes of the conflict that soon broke out between the Spanish party and local people, as we have seen, were of varying importance. Some of the early local attacks on the Spanish were undoubtedly prompted by resentment at the death of infants supposedly caused by baptismal water and by the missionaries' strong opposition to the ancestral shrines honoring skulls of the dead. For the most part, however, the main cause of conflict was retaliation for injuries suffered—always a powerful motive in Chamorro culture to take up arms. The injury given might have been a single personal offense, or it might have been an accumulation of grievances over a period of time. The three different assaults made on the stockade in Hagatña, for instance, almost certainly stemmed from the simmering resentment of key Chamorro leaders at their continual mistreatment at the hands of the Spanish. Such accumulated grievances almost certainly gave rise to the stirring speeches of Hurao and Aguarin, wrapped though they are in a nationalistic rhetoric that is the invention of European authors.

The evangelization of the Marianas, despite the peaceful intentions of the early missionaries, was punctuated by sporadic outbreaks of violence. When San Vitores, who at first refused to bring a military force with him, finally called for Spanish troops, his hope was simply that a strong military presence would have a deterrent effect on the local population. San Vitores himself would not even allow his militia to retaliate for deaths suffered by his mission party. During his four-year stay in the Marianas prior to his death in 1672, a total of eight Chamorros were killed by the Spanish—three accidentally on Tinian and another five during the siege of the Hagatña stockade. Only after his death did the Spanish begin punishing local people for crimes—at first for killing missionaries and their helpers, and then for rallying people to attack the Spanish. The Jesuits reluctantly assented to this escalation of force for fear that the mission would be shut down if local resistance were successful.

The slaying of more missionaries and their helpers may have helped trigger a much stronger response from the Spanish shortly after the death of San Vitores. With the arrival of Esplana in 1674, the Spanish took the offensive, marching on villages and demanding submission to Spanish rule—something that had not been required in earlier years. The death toll increased significantly during those years, as

both military policy and the composition of the garrison changed. The troops, who now included adventurer types and convicts recruited on shipboard along with the remainder of San Vitores' original hand-picked militia, were no longer barred from retaliating as they had been at first. This policy would continue under Esplana and his successors until 1680.²²⁹

Contrary to popular belief, Chamorro casualties in battle decreased with the arrival of Quiroga, notwithstanding the label he has always borne as something of a fanatic. From 1680, the year in which Quiroga assumed command of the Spanish forces, until just before the last major uprising in 1684, there were only about ten Chamorro deaths in violence recorded—an average of just two a year. Violence peaked during the major uprising that occurred in 1684 on Guam, Saipan and Tinian, with the loss of 30 or 35 Chamorro lives, but afterward there was just one more brief outbreak of violence, in 1695, that claimed little loss of life.²³⁰

The Chamorro population was divided in its response to the Spanish missionaries from the outset. Initially, the support that the missionaries received from Kipuha in Hagatña would probably have made them suspect in rival villages. This split in the population became more pronounced as large numbers of Chamorros converted or developed affiliations with the Spanish through marriage and in other ways. In time, the Chamorro group that supported the missionaries grew in strength and numbers, even if for cultural reasons its members were not always able to side openly with the Spanish. Their leaders included such men as Antonio Ayhi, one of the most loyal allies of the Spanish; Ignacio Hineti, who came to the aid of the Spanish during the attack on the garrison in Hagatña in 1684 and prevented the destruction of the garrison; Alonso So'on, dispatched by Quiroga in 1690 to find an island south of the Marianas that had been discovered four years earlier; Juan Hohot, who fought with the Spanish in 1684 and took part in the reduction of the northern islands; and Ignacio Nu'un, who played such a key role in the resettlement of the Gani people in 1698.

By the late 1670s, the people in many villages on Guam were handing over to the Spanish troops fugitives who had sought refuge with them. They did so partly out of self-interest: to avoid incurring punishment by the Spanish forces, and quite possibly also to repay old debts against their local enemies. But new features introduced by the Spanish had a strong appeal for many islanders. Already in 1680 the people of Guam were adjusting to the changes in lifestyle that accompanied their resettlement in the towns: new livestock and food production methods, the

manufacture of clothing, and the use of tobacco, among other things. It is easy to imagine that the Chamorro people eagerly embraced many of these changes and warmed up to the Spanish who introduced them. All this, of course, would have only widened the split in the local population. As one of the priests observed, “If the Spanish should leave the Marianas, there would certainly be many wars among the Indians because so many of them have now switched to our side.”²³¹

Tales of Spanish atrocities in the Marianas abound in the literature, but closer examination of the records reveals that most are spurious. The report that Quiroga and his forces wiped out 200 people in a pre-dawn raid of a village on Saipan in 1684 provides an example of how simple errors can be transformed into legend. In this case, the tale of the 200 deaths is derived from a mistranslation of the statement in the original report: that Quiroga and his men *could have* killed this many if he had wished.²³² In another frequently cited example of mass slaughter, Quiroga in 1680 was reputed to have rounded up and killed 150 fugitives who had fled to Rota, but the letters from this period clearly reveal that only five or six of those captured were executed—and these only after a judicial process that determined they had been responsible for the death of a missionary or lay helper.²³³

A pair of horrifying descriptions of the cruel execution of key Chamorro leaders are to be found in, of all places, the letter of an Austrian Jesuit missionary. According to the author, Fr. Strobach, the man charged with the murder of one priest died in this fashion: “His chest, hands and feet were pinched with red-hot tongs... then every part of him was broken by a club; the head, hands and feet were cut with an axe, and the torso was quartered.”²³⁴ This description, written two years after the alleged torture, takes no account of the report that the Chamorro in question was killed by his own people and his head handed over to the Spanish afterwards.²³⁵ The same Jesuit author takes similar license in describing the death of Cheref, a village leader who was implicated in another murder. Fr. Strobach writes that Cheref was torn apart with red-hot tongs, then killed with a club, and chopped to pieces, with the pieces impaled.²³⁶ This account, written four years after the event, differs from the more commonly accepted version in which Cheref was killed by a single musketball to the body, after which his hands and head were cut off and brought back to Hagatña.²³⁷

The charges of torture and widespread carnage sometimes raised against the Spanish seem to be unsupported by the evidence at hand. Even if the Spanish did not engage in mass slaughter, however, they did burn villages (although not with

people in them) and destroyed canoes. Moreover, the Spanish were already driving large numbers of people to take refuge in remote villages well before the large scale concentration of the population was implemented in 1680. There is no way to measure the toll that this additional hardship would have taken on a population already weakened by disease.

The real sins of the Spanish during their early mission initiative in the Marianas were not the spectacular sort that have so often been attributed to them—massive bloodletting, Inquisition-like torments to force islanders to accept the faith, and cruel punishments for refusal to submit to the Spanish yoke. The most serious damage was effected in less shocking ways, as the governors began to gain a chokehold on the economy and turn the subsidy intended to support the colony into a personal investment fund. As violence subsided after 1684, Spanish officials began to exercise an authority that often reduced local villagers and Spanish troops alike to the status of household servants.²³⁸ Ironically, then, the worst of the indignities suffered by the Chamorro people may have occurred only after the warfare ended.

Violent deaths in the so-called “Spanish-Chamorro Wars” are generally greatly overstated. In the preparation of this paper, I carefully reviewed all the Spanish documents of the period to compile a body count. The number of verified Chamorro deaths in hostilities, as recorded in the Spanish reports over the entire 30-year period, is 57. But there are other instances in which the number of Chamorro deaths is vaguely described as “some” or “a few” or “several.” From my reading of the source material, I would estimate the total Chamorro loss of life in battle and by execution at 110 to 120 in all. This would average out to about four Chamorros a year killed by the Spanish throughout the entire 30-year period. The Spanish, on the other hand, incurred losses of their own: twelve Jesuits along with 26 mission helpers and a few soldiers were slain during the same period, for a loss rate that averaged about two men a year.²³⁹

The death toll for the entire period might seem surprisingly low for those steeped in the exaggerated accounts of the “Spanish-Chamorro Wars” as they have been presented so often in the past, but this modest number is understandable when viewed in the light of traditional island warfare and the constraints imposed on the Spanish by their own goals. Battle casualties were few in traditional island warfare in the Marianas, and Spanish records for the late Seventeenth Century suggest that the encounters between Spanish and Chamorros reflect this same conservative pattern. Deaths were rarer than might be expected since rival forces

usually disengaged after the first few casualties. The restraint with which Chamorro battle was practiced is described in a Jesuit source:

They rarely come to hand-to-hand fighting, and when they do, it is only because they can not avoid it. They are afraid of being hurt and are afraid to shed blood in battle. When two or three men are killed or seriously wounded on one side, the victory is established.²⁴⁰

The Spanish, who might have been more accustomed to fight to the last man, had their own reasons for exercising restraint in battle: they fought under the watchful eyes of the missionaries to protect the evangelization that these men were trying to advance. Quiroga, a devout believer, would have been especially adverse to needless slaughter because in taking the lives of his enemies he would also be consigning them to damnation, according to his beliefs. Even if some of the other military commanders of the period might not have found this thought as troubling, they were still expected to prepare the ground for the planting of the faith, not eliminate the need for it by killing off the population.

Depopulation during this era is an indisputable fact, but most of the fatalities were not the result of violence. Deaths from communicable diseases against which islanders had not yet developed an immunity were occurring from the very start of contact with Europeans. The written sources hint that deaths may have increased markedly from the late 1670s, when the people on Guam and Rota were being herded into larger settlements. During the years 1680-1683, for instance, 917 deaths—or an average of 230 a year—were recorded for Guam and Rota.²⁴¹ By contrast, the number of Chamorro deaths from hostilities, including fugitives captured or killed by their own people, numbered only about twenty during the same four-year period.

The lethal effects of the illnesses that the Spanish brought far outweighed the damage done by their muskets and swords. A single epidemic in 1689, with colds, stomach aches, fever and diarrhea, claimed more than twenty people on Guam alone within a single week. By the end of three months 80 had died—as many deaths, Spanish and Chamorro, as had occurred during the great uprising of 1684-1685. By the end of the year, 166 people had died—more than the number of Chamorro lives claimed during the hostilities with the Spanish throughout the entire 30-year period.²⁴²

The heavy loss of life continued unabated even after the hostilities ended. In the year 1700 alone, 650 Chamorros died of an influenza epidemic. Between 1698 and 1702 there were an average of 600 deaths a year, compared with 240 births, yielding a net loss of 1,800 people during these five years alone.²⁴³ In the light of such numbers, we must conclude that the enormous population decline in the Marianas throughout this period was the consequence of the new diseases introduced to the islands. The concentration of the local population into villages would have only compounded the deadly effects of these contagious illnesses.

The Spanish arrived in the Marianas in 1668, despite strong objections that the islands would be of no conceivable value to the Crown, purely to evangelize the islands. The attempt to bring the blessings of the gospel, like secular efforts to bestow the blessings of civilization on a people, is bound to precipitate cultural conflict that can sometimes become violent. For the Spanish of that era this justified employing the sword as well as the cross to achieve these ends. As one of the early Spanish priests expressed it, “It has always been necessary in this spiritual conquest... that our Spanish zeal carry in its right hand (the ecclesiastical hand) a plow and the seed of the gospel, and in the left (the secular) the sword and the lance, with which to prevent anyone from interfering with the work.”²⁴⁴

The interaction between Spanish and Chamorros was dynamic, with Chamorros taking the initiative and the Spanish reacting as often as the other way around, but always with the terms of engagement changing as a result of new and unexpected occurrences. Misunderstandings, local rivalries, and so much more fueled the escalation of hostilities at times, even as many islanders began siding with the church. By the end of this period, the archipelago had lost the greater part of its population to disease, the surviving islanders had largely become Catholic and were resettled for the most part in a handful of villages, the administrative apparatus of Spanish colonial rule was solidly in place, and the culture was being forever transformed. All this was far more than the purely spiritual conquest that San Vitores and those who authorized his mission may have intended. Yet, it was not so very different from the impact that would be felt in other parts of the Pacific when, in the Nineteenth Century, Europeans and islanders began their intensive encounters with one another. Demographic and cultural earthquakes occurred in those places, too.

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1. Beardsley 1964: 133
2. A previously published monograph of mine, *From Conquest to Colonization* (Hezel 2000), examines an overlapping but later thirty year period of Spanish colonial rule in the Marianas, 1690-1720.
3. The original account of Magellan's visit to Guam can be found in Pigafetta 1969, as well as in the other classical sources such as Burney 1967.
4. Hezel 1983: 32.
5. The classical account of Legazpi's passage across the Pacific and landing on Guam can be found in Sharp 1961: 57-71.
6. The lengthy controversy in Spain over the rights of the "uncivilized" peoples is summarized in Dumont 1994.
7. This, too, is described in Sharp 1961. See also Russell 1998: 271-2.
8. Hezel 1982: 116.
9. These requests were all noted in Antonio Sierra, SJ, "Vicariato de las Islas Carolinas," *El Siglo de las Misiones* 7 (1920), 298ff.
10. Hezel 1982: 116.
11. Hezel 1982: 117. For a fuller account of the friar's stay, see Driver 1983. The story is told in the article "The Account of a Discalced Friar's Stay in the Islands of the Ladrones," *Guam Recorder* 7 (1977), 19-21.
12. Driver 1983.
13. See, for instance, Farrell (2011) for accounts of each of these visits.
14. Hezel 1983: 14.
15. For a summary of these early contacts and their impacts, see Farrell (2011), Russell (1998), or other histories of the Marianas. Barratt (2003) offers a much more detailed account of these early visits.
16. Johnston 1979: 24-25.
17. See, for instance, Garcia 2004: 96. The references in San Vitores' own letters and in Garcia's biography to the intense longing of San Vitores to return to the Marianas are too numerous to cite.
18. The objections of the authorities in the Philippines to opening the new mission are laid out in Garcia 2004: 138-139.
19. Royal cedula from Queen Mariana to the Viceroy of New Mexico, 12 August 1671, AGN Reales Cedula, XII, 85. The English translation of this document can be found in Driver 1979: 59-60.
20. Fr. San Vitores to Queen Regent, February 1668, in Levesque 4: 411.
21. Garcia 2004: 138.

22. The two interpreters were Estevan Diaz and Francisco de Mendoza, both of whom joined his mission party in the Marianas. See Fr. San Vitores to Viceroy of Mexico, 3 January 1668; in Levesque 4: 349, 392.
23. We are told that there were 19 Filipinos and 12 Spaniards, besides the six Jesuits, in the mission party. Many of the Filipinos are named and their trades mentioned in Fr. San Vitores, "Requirements of the Mission to the Marianas," 1668, in Levesque 4: 392. More information on these individuals is provided in Viana 2004. Other names are supplied in a letter of Br. Marcelo Ansaldo, 1668, and in the editor's notes that accompany the translation of the letter in Levesque 4: 486. The term "Spanish" throughout this article refers to the entire mission party, which included Filipinos, *criollos* born in Mexico and South America, and, for that matter, Jesuits from France, Italy and other parts of Europe, along with true Spaniards.
24. Viana (2004) makes the point quite clearly that these mission helpers did double duty in serving as the military guard. For years many of us, myself included, had assumed that the military escort and the mission helpers were separate groups, each made up of about thirty people. The documents for this period, however, suggest that the military escort was made up of all the lay mission helpers, perhaps twenty or 25 in all, filled out with a few professional soldiers or people chosen on the ship to serve in that capacity. All sources agree that the total number of men accompanying the Jesuits was 31. Serving as the captain of the militia during those early years was Juan de la Cruz Panday, a Filipino blacksmith by trade.
25. San Vitores to the Queen Regent, February 1668, in Levesque 4: 413-415.
26. San Vitores, Requirements of the Mission to the Marianas, February 1668, in Levesque 4: 396.
27. This Filipino is incorrectly identified by Farrell and others as Pedro Calungsod, the young companion of San Vitores who was killed with him in 1672 and recently canonized by the Catholic Church. In fact, it was Pedro Ximenez, another of the survivors of the *Concepcion* shipwreck. See Levesque 4: 486. Pedro Calungsod was one of the twelve-year-old sopranos who accompanied the missionary party.
28. Coomans 1997: 5.
29. Coomans 1997: 5.
30. Garcia 2004: 179.
31. Garcia 2004: 179.
32. The population estimate of 12,000 for Guam is found in Coomans 1997: 7. In his letters on shipboard in 1668, San Vitores' own estimate of the Guam population seems to have ranged between 20,000 and 50,000, with the population expanding in each letter he sent. Coomans (1997: 22-23) also offers estimates of the population of the other islands: Rota 2,000; Tinian 3,000; Saipan 6,000; and a few hundred in each of the northern islands.
33. The ethnographic literature on Chuuk and the atolls of the Central Carolines is clear on this point. For an assessment of early matrilineality and matrilocality on Pohnpei, see Petersen 2009: 43-50.
34. Garcia 2004: 187.
35. Garcia 2004: 169, offers examples of the respect behavior, including the polite greeting and the custom of touching the chest of a superior.
36. Cited in Russell 1998: 141. See also Garcia 2004: 172. Russell (1998: 143-147) offers a summary of what is known about the social organization and authority system in pre-contact Marianas.
37. For a fuller review of the sources and a presentation of the evidence for and against this caste system, see Russell 1998: 141-144.
38. Garcia 2004: 172.
39. Quoted in Russell 1998: 141.
40. In most of Micronesia, young men who had reached sexual maturity would have been forbidden from sleeping in their home if they had sisters. They would have been obliged to find refuge in the canoe house or some other place to pass the evenings.
41. The young women who served in these houses were not forced into servitude. The women and their families were almost certainly rewarded handsomely for their service with traditional valuables and prestige, not to mention the prospect of a very suitable marriage.
42. Similar clubhouses were destroyed in Yap and Palau during German rule at the beginning of the 20th century without strong resistance from the local population. Likewise, the early documents in the Marianas nowhere suggest that the destruction of these houses was likely to provoke strong resistance. No one seriously maintains that the Spanish destruction of these houses was responsible for the ensuing conflict. Fr. Xaramillo reports that 30 houses were destroyed in a single year (1679-80), and 30 had been destroyed prior to that time. See letter of Fr. Xaramillo to the King, 29 June 1684, in Levesque 8: 143ff.
43. Coomans 1997: 36.
44. Hezel 1982: 119.
45. Garcia 2004: 184.
46. Garcia 2004: 202.
47. Garcia 2004: 184.
48. The villages with schools are listed as Hagatña, Ayran, Orote and Ritidian. See Garcia 2004: 205.
49. Hezel 1982: 120.
50. Coomans 1997: 27-28; and Garcia 2004: 198. Although the documents suggest that these killings were influenced by the tales of Choco, they mention that the young Filipino was innocent of the "guilt" imputed to the older Spaniard. The sources are silent on whether the "guilt" was due to the man's association with the baptisms conducted on the island or some other offense such as attempted rape.
51. The violence occurred in the village of Nisichan, located on the eastern side of the island near present-day University of Guam.
52. The holy oils used in the baptismal rite might have made Choco's claim even more credible since oils were used in the islands to prepare the bodies of the dead for burial. In any case, San Vitores decided to face down his adversary and so traveled to Pa'a, the village in southern Guam in which Choco was living, to dispute his charges face to face. The documents tell us that Choco yielded to the priest and allowed himself to be baptized, but lapsed and returned to his former ways soon after the priest left his village. Garcia 2004: 192-195.
53. Garcia 2004: 190-1.
54. Garcia 2004: 214.

55. Garcia 2004: 191.
56. Quoted in a dispatch from the Queen Regent to the Viceroy of New Spain, 12 November 1672; see Hezel 1982: 122.
57. Hezel 1982: 122, n29. See Fr. San Vitores' letter of July 1669, in Barrett 1975: 38-45.
58. Garcia 2004: 218-222.
59. Garcia 2004: 365-368. See also Coomans (1997: 46-50), who reports that Medina, after he was offered hospitality in Raurau, angered the villagers when he insisted that the ancestral skulls be cleared out of the house in which he was staying.
60. Garcia 2004: 235.
61. Garcia 2004: 236.
62. Payback for a perceived insult, often delivered as soon as the young men of the village could be mobilized to avenge this insult, was a characteristic of Chamorro society at that time—and, according to many present-day Chamorros—it still is.
63. Garcia 2004: 188.
64. Dobbin 2012: *passim*.
65. Garcia 2004: 235.
66. Hurao's often cited speech, composed by Charles LeGobien, a French Jesuit who drew on Fr. Luis Morales for his material, is a splendid example of stirring nationalistic rhetoric. See Gobien 1701: 140-144.
67. Garcia 2004: 238-239.
68. For a good description of the style of traditional warfare, see Russell 1998: 209-217. The author cites Garcia 2004: 170.
69. The eight Chamorros killed during this period included two on Saipan (Garcia 2004: 222-223); a man from Hagatña killed accidentally while protecting an accomplice in murder (Garcia 2004: 236); and five men during the attack on the Hagatña stockade (Garcia 2004: 242). The Spanish killed included two of the militia in August 1668 (Garcia 2004: 198), a mission helper from Malabar in 1669 (Garcia 2004: 214); Fr. Medina and a mission helper in 1670 (Garcia 2004: 368); and a Mexican mission helper in 1671 (Garcia 2004: 235).
70. Garcia (2004: 236-237) offers the example of one prominent convert, Antonio Ayhi, who provided the Spaniards with information on the plans of the enemy and, when he could, food. As Garcia puts it, Ayhi carefully "avoided all signs of friendship with the Spaniards, the better to help them without doing harm to himself."
71. The three were Ignacio Osi, Matias Yay and Pedro Guiran. Pedro died on the return passage, but the other two returned to Guam in 1675, three years after San Vitores' death. Garcia 2004: 230-232.
72. Chochogo is close to the present day village of Toto.
73. Hezel 1982: 124; Garcia 2004: 247-249.
74. Hezel 1982: 124-125; Garcia 2004: 251-252. Garcia's description of the killing suggests that Matapang, the instigator of the deed, bore a personal grudge against San Vitores or perhaps one of the other missionaries, even though Matapang is depicted as scornfully referring to both the Choco stories of poisoned water and the destruction of the sacred skulls. Garcia's account illustrates the dilemma faced by supporters of the mission party. Hiraio, Matapang's accomplice, was one of the latter, but made the decision to assist in the killing for fear of being regarded as a coward.
75. Garcia 2004: 386.
76. The number of muskets had grown considerably from 1668 since the yearly ships dropped off a few more each time they put into Guam. Garcia 2004: 387.
77. Beardsley (1964: 133) claims that the slaying of San Vitores "precipitated a truly general war of decimation against the native population of the island, for the assassination of their leader made even the calm Jesuits militant." This author depicts Fr. Solano, "San Vitores' grim successor," as a man all too ready to exercise his "stern authority" to avenge this and the other deaths of Jesuits. Beardsley's interpretation is at odds with what the Spanish letters of this day tell us.
78. Garcia 2004: 387.
79. One of the two Filipinos killed came as a mission helper and had lived in the far northern islands of Gani as a catechist. There he had married a local woman. The other, Francisco Maunahun, had lived in the islands since the wreck of the galleon *Concepcion* in 1638. Garcia 2004: 392-393.
80. Garcia 2004: 408.
81. "Militia," of course, must be understood as composed of those lay assistants whom San Vitores had been able to recruit. Most had learned to defend themselves by this time, even if only one or two had ever received any military training. Garcia 2004: 424; Driver 1987: 15.
82. Child soldiers were nothing unusual in those days. Indeed, some of the mission helpers in the Marianas who served as sometime militiamen were only twelve years of age when they arrived.
83. Driver 1987: 17.
84. Garcia 2004: 424.
85. Hezel 1982: 126.
86. Garcia 2004: 424.
87. Garcia 2004: 426.
88. Garcia 2004: 429.
89. Garcia 2004: 431.
90. Garcia 2004: 431-432.
91. Garcia 2004: 434-435.
92. This tribute of one Jesuit missionary, the author of the annual letter of 1675, is quoted in Calvo 1970: 209.
93. Garcia (2004: 435, 453) reports the arrival of twenty additional troops in 1675, and another fourteen the following year in addition to two Filipino families brought in to serve the mission.
94. Garcia 2004: 455.
95. Garcia 2004: 456.
96. This is the official account of the killing offered in Garcia 2004: 438. In a slightly different account, offered by one of the Jesuits in a letter to his provincial, we are told that Br. Diaz discovered some young men in the girls' quarters and scolded them on the spot, but they took no action against him. It was only the next morning, after Br. Diaz collared one of the young men and threatened

- to bring him to the commander, “who would kill him in punishment... just as he had done to another a few days before,” that the people killed the brother and a lay companion, burned the church and desecrated the images. Fr. Gayoso to Provincial, 13 September 1676, in Levesque 6: 567.
97. Garcia 2004: 449-451.
 98. Garcia 2004: 457.
 99. Garcia 2004: 457-458. Another speech attributed to Aguarin is cited in Garcia 2004: 470.
 100. Garcia (2004: 458-461) attributes Cheref’s betrayal of the priest and the Spanish troops to retaliation for the Spanish execution of the father of the bride a few months earlier. The execution, in turn, was punishment exacted for the man’s role in killing a Spanish mission helper. This illustrates as well as anything the cycle of retaliation at work in the islands at that time.
 101. Garcia 2004: 471.
 102. Garcia 2004: 470-475.
 103. In 1674, Esplana’s attack on Chochogo, Tumon and another unnamed village resulted in four identified killings and an additional “several deaths,” Garcia (2004: 426-429) reports. In 1675, two Chamorros were said to have been killed during Esplana’s expedition to the south (Garcia 2004: 434-435). In 1676, twelve were killed: five in the attack on Talisay (Garcia 2004: 455), another hanged for killing one of the Jesuit priests (Garcia 2004: 456), and six during the siege in Hagatña (Garcia 2004: 473-475).
 104. The Spanish losses included four Jesuits and fourteen mission helpers.
 105. Garcia 2004: 490.
 106. Garcia 2004: 481.
 107. Garcia 2004: 477.
 108. Fr. Bouwens, annual report for 1676-1677, in Levesque 6: 624; Fr. Xaramillo, annual report for 1679-1680, in Levesque 7: 319.
 109. Garcia 2004: 479-483.
 110. Garcia 2004: 484.
 111. Fr. Xaramillo, annual report for 1679-1680, in Levesque 7: 309ff.
 112. Fr. Xaramillo, annual report for 1679-1680, in Levesque 7: 309ff.
 113. Fr. Xaramillo, annual report for 1679-1680, in Levesque 7: 309ff.
 114. Garcia 2004: 484. All the events described here occurred in early 1679.
 115. Garcia 2004: 492.
 116. Garcia 2004: 498.
 117. These figures are derived from the missionary letters, especially the annual reports, and Garcia. The estimated total number of deaths is consistent with one Jesuit’s claim that “in the four years that I lived in the Marianas (1676-1680), the captains carried out the death penalty on more than 30 individuals;” letter of Fr. Antonio Jaramillo, 20 December 1680, in Levesque 7: 341. We should remember that the “captains” referred to in the letter include local allies as well as the Spanish militia.
 118. Fr. Coomans, 6 June 1680, in Levesque 7: 238.
 119. The newcomer was Jose de Quiroga, who would later become acting governor for a year and military commander of the Spanish forces for much longer. See Quiroga to Duchess of Aveiro, 1680, in Levesque 7: 214.
 120. Fr. Besco to Fr. Espinar, 10 June 1680, in Levesque 7: 257.
 121. Fr. Coomans, report for 1681-1682; in Repetti 1940: 319. The rapid decline in population is illustrated in one Jesuit’s letter to the king in which he reports 917 deaths on Guam and Rota in the period 1680-1683; Fr. Xaramillo to the King, 29 June 1684, in Levesque 8: 145.
 122. Garcia 2004: 490; Quiroga to Duchess of Aveiro, 1680, in Levesque 7: 211.
 123. Fr. Besco, annual report for 1679-1680, in Levesque 7: 222.
 124. Fr. Xaramillo, annual report for 1679-1680, in Levesque 7: 307.
 125. Quiroga to Duchess of Aveiro, 1680, in Levesque 7: 209-213. The girls school had been operating for years in Hagatña, but it would be rebuilt in 1681. See Fr. Solorzano, annual report for 1681-1682, in Repetti 1945-46: 435.
 126. Garcia 2004: 456.
 127. Garcia 2004: 490.
 128. Fr. Morales to Rome, 1680, cited in Barrett 1975: 54.
 129. Fr. Xaramillo, annual report for 1679-1680, in Levesque 7: 311.
 130. Garcia 2004: 486.
 131. Fr. Morales to Rome, 1680, cited in Barrett 1975: 54.
 132. Fr. Xaramillo, annual report for 1679-1680, in Levesque 7: 313.
 133. Quiroga to Duchess of Aveiro, 1680, in Levesque 7: 205.
 134. Quiroga to Duchess of Aveiro, 1680, in Levesque 7: 205.
 135. Fr. Gayoso to Provincial, 1676, in Levesque 6: 558.
 136. Fr. Xaramillo, annual report for 1679-1680, in Levesque 7: 311-3.
 137. Fr. Besco, annual report for 1679-1680, in Levesque 7: 222.
 138. Fr. Besco to Fr. Espinar, June 1680, in Levesque 7: 259. Inapsan remained the most troubled of the villages, however. The residence there was burned in 1681 and afterwards restored, but two years later the church was rebuilt in Ritidan, which became the new population center for the northern part of the island. Another of these villages, Mapupan, located inland between Apra and the Talafofo area, was closed two years later. Fr. Solorzano, annual report 1681-1682, in Levesque 7: 545-457.
 139. Fr. Coomans, in his letter of 1682, reports that “the former settlements were burned and the skulls of their ancestors scattered.” The scattering of the ancestral skulls, like the burning of the old homesteads, was an intentional part of the uprooting process; see Levesque 7: 566.
 140. Fr. Solorzano, annual report for 1681-1682, in Repetti 1945-46: 433-434.
 141. This village authority structure was still operative at the time of the first Spanish censuses of the colony in 1710 and 1721.
 142. Fr. Solorzano to Fr. Garcia, 20 May 1681, in Levesque 7: 442; Fr. Francisco de Borja, 8 July 1680, in Levesque 7: 501.

143. Fr. Xaramillo, annual report for 1679-1680, in Levesque 7: 321; Fr. Francisco de Borja, 8 July 1680, in Levesque 7: 501.
144. Official appointment of Saravia as governor by the King, 26 August 1679, in Levesque 7: 135.
145. Fr. Xaramillo, annual report for 1670-1680, in Levesque 7: 309.
146. Fr. Solorzano, annual report for 1681-1682, in Repetti 1945-46: 434-435.
147. Garcia 2004: 500-501.
148. Fr. Francisco de Borja, 8 July 1680, in Levesque 7: 501.
149. Fr. Strobach, Report on the Mariana Island Mission, 1682, in Levesque 7: 605.
150. Fr. Solorzano, annual report for 1681-1682, in Repetti 1945-46: 435.
151. See, for instance, Fr. Solorzano to Fr. Francisco Garcia, 20 May 1681, in Levesque 7: 441, 446.
152. Garcia 2004: 498.
153. Fr. Solorzano to Fr. Francisco Garcia, 20 May 1681, in Levesque 7: 446.
154. Garcia 2004: 502.
155. Fr. Bouwens to Fr. Salgado, 20 May 1681, in Levesque 7: 431.
156. Fr. Bouwens to Fr. Salgado, 20 May 1681, in Levesque 7: 431; and Fr. Solorzano to Fr. Garcia, 20 May 1681, in Levesque 7: 446.
157. Fr. Gayoso to Provincial, 13 September 1676, in Levesque 6: 567. The priest reporting the executions remarks in his letter that only one of the two men deserved his punishment. He adds that a third was executed a few days later for instigating an affair with one of the girls in the mission school.
158. Fr. Solorzano to Fr. Garcia, 20 May 1681, in Levesque 7: 443.
159. Fr. Solorzano to Fr. Francisco Garcia, 20 May 1681, in Levesque 7: 440.
160. Hezel 2000: 34.
161. Fr. Solorzano to Fr. Garcia, 20 May 1681, in Levesque 7: 442.
162. Fr. Xaramillo, annual report for 1679-1680, in Levesque 7: 329.
163. Hezel 1982: 128; Garcia 2004: 503. The refugees from Inapsan may have lost the battle but they apparently won the war, since the church in their village on Guam was moved to Ritidian within the next year or two.
164. Fr. Coomans, annual report for 1681-1682; in Repetti 1940: 319.
165. Fr. Solorzano, annual report 1681-1682, in Levesque 7: 557.
166. Fr. Coomans, annual report for 1681-1682; in Repetti 1940: 320.
167. Fr. Tilpe to Fr. Espinar, 15 May 1682, in Levesque 7: 526-7.
168. Fr. Tilpe to Fr. Espinar, 15 May 1682, in Levesque 7: 526-7.
169. Fr. Bouwens to Fr. Noyelle, 1684; in Repetti 1941b: 95-96.
170. Fr. Solorzano To Fr. General Oliva, 25 May 1682, in Levesque 7: 535.
171. Fr. Coomans, 30 May 1683; in Repetti 1940: 344.
172. Fr. Zarzosa to Fr. Juan de la Fuente, 28 April 1683, in Levesque 7: 670-1.
173. Fr. Solorzano, annual report for 1681-1682; in Repetti 1946: 433.
174. The importance of the timely arrival of the galleon in Manila is explained in greater detail in Driver 1987: 22.
175. The complaints about the foot dragging in Manila appear frequently in the missionary letters of this period. For a particularly pointed example, see Fr. Salgado to Duchess of Aveiro, 29 June 1683, in Maggs Brothers 1922: 169.
176. Fr. Xaramillo, 17 June 1681, in Levesque 7: 492.
177. Fr. Coomans to Rome, 20 February 1684, in Repetti 1941a: 409-410.
178. Fr. Bouwens to Fr. Noyelle, 1684, in Repetti 1941c: 96.
179. Fr. Coomans to Fr. Charles Noyelle, May 1684, in Repetti 1941b. Although there are some discrepancies in the number reported, it appears that more than 70 troops, or about half of the 140 Spanish troops in the colony at this time, were sent north on this expedition; Fr. Morales, annual report for 1684-1685, in Abella 1962: 12.
180. Fr. Morales, annual report for 1684-1685, in Abella 1962: 12-13.
181. Fr. Coomans to Fr. Charles Noyelle, May 1684, in Repetti 1941b: 496.
182. Fr. Coomans to Fr. Charles Noyelle, May 1684; in Repetti 1941b.
183. Fr. Bouwens to king, May 1685, in Levesque 8: 200.
184. Fr. Morales, annual report for 1684-1685, in Abella 1962: 14. Yura's name is sometimes given as Yoda, as in, for instance, Russell 1998: 308.
185. Fr. Morales, annual report for 1684-1685, in Abella 1962: 16-17.
186. Fr. Kuklein, annual report for 1684-1685, in Levesque 8: 248.
187. Fr. Morales, annual report for 1684-1685, in Abella 1962: 13-16; Fr. Bouwens to king, May 1685, in Levesque 8: 202. See also Hezel 1982: 129-130.
188. Fr. Bouwens to king, May 1685, in Levesque 8: 205.
189. Fr. Morales, annual report for 1684-1685, in Abella 1962: 21.
190. Fr. Morales, annual report for 1684-1685, in Abella 1962: 19-20.
191. Hezel 1982: 130.
192. Fr. Bouwens to king, May 1685, in Levesque 8: 205.
193. Fr. Kuklein, annual report for 1684-1685, in Levesque 8: 250. Fr. Morales suggests more modest casualties when he writes that the Spanish "killed a few of the enemy," and he is careful to mention that Quiroga spared the lives of the wounded; Fr. Morales, annual report for 1684-1685, in Abella 1962: 32. A third report, likewise, suggests that only a few died; Fr. Bouwens to king, May 1685, in Levesque 8: 208.
194. In his hasty departure Quiroga had to leave behind three of the boats with fifteen soldiers aboard because the boats could not manage the swift currents offshore. The men made it to Tinian safely, were welcomed ashore and kept safe for fear that any mistreatment of them would bring reprisals from the Spanish. Quiroga and the rest of the troops arrived at Guam on November 23 after two days sailing. Fr. Morales, annual report for 1684-1685, in Abella 1962: 37. See also Hezel 1982: 130-131.
195. One of the Jesuits wrote: "Five Filipino soldiers, who had lowered themselves over the wall at

- night, had already crossed over to the enemy and almost all their compatriots were planning to follow them.” Fr. Kuklein, annual report for 1684-1685, in Levesque 8: 249.
196. Fr. Kuklein, annual report for 1684-1685, in Levesque 8: 247.
197. Fr. Morales, annual report for 1684-1685, in Abella 1962: 37-38; Hezel 1982: 131.
198. See, for example, one strong indictment of the new troops: Fr. Solorzano to Fr. Garcia, 20 May 1681, in Levesque 7: 443.
199. Fr. Morales writes that the people of the island were at first reluctant to join, “recalling the debacle of past wars, the failure of their projects, the numerous Indians who had died, and the few of them if any who had been spared by Spanish reprisals; but they easily changed their opinions in view of the confused news...that the islands of the north had treacherously killed all the Spanish soldiers who were found therein.” See Fr. Morales, annual report for 1684-1685, in Abella 1962: 19-20.
200. The deaths on Saipan are reported in Fr. Coomans, 1684, in Levesque 8: 91-101. The losses on Asuncion are mentioned in Fr Bouwens to king, May 1685, in Levesque 8: 202.
201. Fr. Morales, annual report for 1684-1685; in Abella 1962: 32.
202. In the annual report for 1686-1687, Fr. Bouwens rages against the judgment of Esplana [Levesque 9:48-50]. In their report on the state of the Marianas mission in 1691, Frs. Zarzosa and Bustillo suggest that Esplana might have used the rough weather as an excuse for not offloading the supplies for the Jesuits that arrived on the Spanish ship that year. In a departure from customary politeness, the Jesuits call the governor “Esplana” with no honorifics or titles prefixed. They also refer to his long discussions with authorities on the ship as conducted “with an elegant style that was so typical of such a political man” [Zarzosa and Bustillos, 5 May 1691, Real Academia de la Historia, Cortes 567, Leg 12]. This source was not translated by Levesque, but the rough contents of the letter can be found in another letter of Fr. Zarzosa, 5 May 1691, in Levesque 9: 452-463.
203. Fr. Bouwens, letter to Fr. Garcia, 20 May 1685, in Levesque 8: 287.
204. Fr. Bustillo, 30 May 1686, in Levesque 8: 585.
205. Fr. Bustillo, 30 May 1686, in Levesque 8: 583.
206. Fr. Bustillo, 10 June 1687, in Levesque 9: 55-56.
207. Fr. Bouwens, 12 May 1689, in Levesque 9: 262-263. This interesting letter, which was written to make recommendations for improving the government of the Marianas, offers a fascinating look at the social realities of the day.
208. Hezel 2000: 36-37.
209. Driver 1987: 28-29
210. Gobien 1701: 164.
211. Gobien 1701: 164.
212. Gobien 1701: 164.
213. Fr. Zarzosa, 5 May 1691, in Levesque 9: 457-461. Driver 1987: 36-37.
214. Fr. Zarzosa, 5 May 1691, in Levesque 9: 461-462.
215. Driver 1987: 17.
216. Astrain 1920: VI, 834.
217. Fr. Bustillo, 30 May 1686, in Levesque 8: 583.
218. Hezel 2000: 18.
219. Fr. Bustillo, annual report 1689-1690, in Levesque 9: 503-504.
220. Hezel 2000: 19-20; Fr. Bustillo, annual report 1689-1690, in Levesque 9: 509.
221. Quoted in Fr. Bustillo, annual report 1689-1690, in Levesque 9: 420. *(The translation is my own from the original document.)*
222. Fr. Bustillo, annual report 1689-1690, in Levesque 9: 409.
223. The population estimate is found in Astrain 1920: VI, 831.
224. Astrain 1920: VI, 830-832.
225. For a fuller account of the 1695 expedition, see Gobien 1701: 173ff; Ibanez y Garcia 1886: 65-66; and Hezel 2000: 8-11.
226. Letter of Fr. Bouwens in 1699, quoted in Astrain 1920: VI, 834.
227. Further details of the final reduction of the northern islands can be found in Hezel 2000: 11-13; and Astrain 1920: VI, 834-835.
228. The documents for this period allow for this much more than some might imagine. Although almost entirely Spanish, the reports and letters of the missionaries and key officials are often surprisingly sympathetic to the concerns of the local population.
229. The escalation of the Spanish counter-offensive during the period 1674-1680 accounts for the increased number of Chamorro deaths, estimated at 50 or 60, during those years.
230. In the 1684 uprising, it might be noted, the Spanish suffered greater losses than the opposing Chamorro forces.
231. Fr. Xaramillo, annual report for 1679-1680, in Levesque 7, 310.
232. Fr. Bouwens, in his annual report for 1684-1685, writes: “Pudo el Sargento Mayor hacer en los indios gran destrozo quitando la vida a más de doscientos hombres.” The mistranslation is found in Levesque 8: 354.
233. Garcia 2004: 498. See also Hezel 1982: 133.
234. Fr. Strobach, May 1683, in Levesque 7: 684.
235. The man’s death is described in Garcia 2004: 484.
236. Fr. Strobach, May 1683, in Levesque 7: 684.
237. Garcia 2004: 484.
238. This is dealt with at some length in “The Burden of Colonization,” a chapter from a previous publication; Hezel 2000: 31-44.
239. Villalobos, “Victimas sacrificadas por los indigenas de Islas,” in Levesque 8: 184-5.
240. Gobien 1701: 54.
241. Fr. Xaramillo to the King, 29 June 1684, in Levesque 8: 145.
242. Fr. Bustillo, annual report 1689-90, in Levesque 9: 412, 425.
243. Hezel 2000: 31.
244. Garcia 2004: 504.



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During his years with Micronesia Seminar, Hezel organized dozens of workshops on a variety of public issues and gave personal presentations at many conferences organized by others. He produced over 70 video documentaries for local broadcast, including a seven hour series on the history of Micronesia. A self-taught historian, Hezel has published twelve books and more than a hundred articles on Micronesia. His works include two volumes on the history of Micronesia: *The First Taint of Civilization* and *Strangers in Their Own Land*. He has also written a monograph and a handful of journal articles monographs on the early Spanish evangelization and colonization of the Marianas. His recent writings include *The New Shape of Old Island Culture*, an analysis of cultural change since World War II, and *Making Sense of Micronesia*, an attempt to offer a practical guide to the culture of the islands.